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Earth Spinning

 
H.CON.RES.332
 
 
 
The United States Congress passed the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime. It took the United States government only five years before the operation of "shock and awe" was started. As Bush declared both Iraq and Iran as part of the "axis of evil" with North Korea, the Congress has put into effect the same type of bill or measure in terms of a resolution, not a bonafide bill to attack Iran. The following is a shocking but startling look at the provisions of the bill and the like. It should be noted that anti-war "proponents" like Dennis Kucinich voted for these resoultions just as he did in 1998 for the Iraqi Liberation Act. Kucinich has been exposed for the double-talker he is! And many more like him show up in this latest pro-war bill by the United States government. Here it is folks:
 
 
 
 
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
 
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
 
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/20/2003:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE(S):
Committee/Subcommittee: Activity:
House International Relations Referral, In Committee
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELATED BILL DETAILS:  (additional related bills may be indentified in Status)
Bill: Relationship:
S.CON.RES.81 Identical bill identified by CRS
 
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMENDMENT(S):
***NONE***
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COSPONSORS(230), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Rep Aderholt, Robert B. [AL-4] - 3/23/2004 Rep Akin, W. Todd [MO-2] - 2/24/2004
Rep Alexander, Rodney [LA-5] - 2/3/2004 Rep Allen, Thomas H. [ME-1] - 3/9/2004
Rep Andrews, Robert E. [NJ-1] - 11/21/2003 Rep Baca, Joe [CA-43] - 3/2/2004
Rep Bachus, Spencer [AL-6] - 2/11/2004 Rep Baker, Richard H. [LA-6] - 2/10/2004
Rep Ballance, Frank W., Jr. [NC-1] - 3/11/2004 Rep Barrett, J. Gresham [SC-3] - 3/23/2004
Rep Bass, Charles F. [NH-2] - 2/3/2004 Rep Beauprez, Bob [CO-7] - 2/24/2004
Rep Bell, Chris [TX-25] - 2/10/2004 Rep Berkley, Shelley [NV-1] - 2/24/2004
Rep Berman, Howard L. [CA-28] - 11/20/2003 Rep Bishop, Rob [UT-1] - 3/2/2004
Rep Bishop, Sanford D., Jr. [GA-2] - 3/16/2004 Rep Bishop, Timothy H. [NY-1] - 3/16/2004
Rep Boehlert, Sherwood L. [NY-24] - 3/9/2004 Rep Bonilla, Henry [TX-23] - 2/11/2004
Rep Bonner, Jo [AL-1] - 2/11/2004 Rep Boswell, Leonard L. [IA-3] - 3/23/2004
Rep Bradley, Jeb [NH-1] - 1/20/2004 Rep Brady, Robert [PA-1] - 3/23/2004
Rep Brown, Corrine [FL-3] - 4/20/2004 Rep Brown, Henry E., Jr. [SC-1] - 3/18/2004
Rep Brown, Sherrod [OH-13] - 3/30/2004 Rep Burgess, Michael C. [TX-26] - 3/30/2004
Rep Burns, Max [GA-12] - 2/24/2004 Rep Burr, Richard [NC-5] - 2/24/2004
Rep Burton, Dan [IN-5] - 2/11/2004 Rep Camp, Dave [MI-4] - 4/2/2004
Rep Cantor, Eric [VA-7] - 2/24/2004 Rep Cardin, Benjamin L. [MD-3] - 3/2/2004
Rep Cardoza, Dennis A. [CA-18] - 11/20/2003 Rep Carson, Brad [OK-2] - 2/4/2004
Rep Case, Ed [HI-2] - 11/20/2003 Rep Castle, Michael N. [DE] - 3/9/2004
Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Chandler, Ben [KY-6] - 3/2/2004
Rep Chocola, Chris [IN-2] - 3/10/2004 Rep Clay, Wm. Lacy [MO-1] - 2/25/2004
Rep Coble, Howard [NC-6] - 3/30/2004 Rep Cole, Tom [OK-4] - 11/21/2003
Rep Cooper, Jim [TN-5] - 2/3/2004 Rep Costello, Jerry F. [IL-12] - 2/26/2004
Rep Cox, Christopher [CA-48] - 2/24/2004 Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr. [AL-5] - 4/22/2004
Rep Crane, Philip M. [IL-8] - 3/4/2004 Rep Crenshaw, Ander [FL-4] - 6/18/2004
Rep Crowley, Joseph [NY-7] - 2/24/2004 Rep Culberson, John Abney [TX-7] - 3/24/2004
Rep Davis, Artur [AL-7] - 2/25/2004 Rep Davis, Danny K. [IL-7] - 5/5/2004
Rep Davis, Jim [FL-11] - 4/20/2004 Rep Davis, Jo Ann [VA-1] - 2/26/2004
Rep Davis, Lincoln [TN-4] - 2/10/2004 Rep Davis, Tom [VA-11] - 3/23/2004
Rep DeGette, Diana [CO-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Deutsch, Peter [FL-20] - 11/20/2003
Rep Diaz-Balart, Lincoln [FL-21] - 3/23/2004 Rep Diaz-Balart, Mario [FL-25] - 3/16/2004
Rep Doolittle, John T. [CA-4] - 3/16/2004 Rep Edwards, Chet [TX-11] - 2/24/2004
Rep Ehlers, Vernon J. [MI-3] - 3/23/2004 Rep Emanuel, Rahm [IL-5] - 2/3/2004
Rep Emerson, Jo Ann [MO-8] - 3/10/2004 Rep Engel, Eliot L. [NY-17] - 3/9/2004
Rep Eshoo, Anna G. [CA-14] - 3/24/2004 Rep Evans, Lane [IL-17] - 2/24/2004
Rep Feeney, Tom [FL-24] - 12/8/2003 Rep Ferguson, Mike [NJ-7] - 2/11/2004
Rep Filner, Bob [CA-51] - 3/25/2004 Rep Foley, Mark [FL-16] - 5/5/2004
Rep Ford, Harold E., Jr. [TN-9] - 3/3/2004 Rep Fossella, Vito [NY-13] - 3/10/2004
Rep Franks, Trent [AZ-2] - 3/3/2004 Rep Frost, Martin [TX-24] - 1/20/2004
Rep Garrett, Scott [NJ-5] - 2/24/2004 Rep Gerlach, Jim [PA-6] - 3/3/2004
Rep Gordon, Bart [TN-6] - 1/20/2004 Rep Green, Gene [TX-29] - 2/4/2004
Rep Green, Mark [WI-8] - 2/25/2004 Rep Greenwood, James C. [PA-8] - 2/10/2004
Rep Gutierrez, Luis V. [IL-4] - 3/9/2004 Rep Gutknecht, Gil [MN-1] - 5/5/2004
Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36] - 11/20/2003 Rep Harris, Katherine [FL-13] - 3/30/2004
Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [FL-23] - 3/18/2004 Rep Hayes, Robin [NC-8] - 3/23/2004
Rep Hefley, Joel [CO-5] - 2/24/2004 Rep Herger, Wally [CA-2] - 2/24/2004
Rep Hill, Baron P. [IN-9] - 3/3/2004 Rep Hoeffel, Joseph M. [PA-13] - 3/16/2004
Rep Holden, Tim [PA-17] - 3/16/2004 Rep Holt, Rush D. [NJ-12] - 3/11/2004
Rep Honda, Michael M. [CA-15] - 3/30/2004 Rep Hoyer, Steny H. [MD-5] - 3/16/2004
Rep Hulshof, Kenny C. [MO-9] - 3/23/2004 Rep Israel, Steve [NY-2] - 2/24/2004
Rep Jackson, Jesse L., Jr. [IL-2] - 3/4/2004 Rep Jackson-Lee, Sheila [TX-18] - 2/10/2004
Rep Jefferson, William J. [LA-2] - 3/25/2004 Rep John, Christopher [LA-7] - 2/11/2004
Rep Johnson, Timothy V. [IL-15] - 3/16/2004 Rep Jones, Walter B., Jr. [NC-3] - 11/20/2003
Rep Kelly, Sue W. [NY-19] - 3/9/2004 Rep Kennedy, Mark R. [MN-6] - 2/24/2004
Rep Kildee, Dale E. [MI-5] - 2/25/2004 Rep Kind, Ron [WI-3] - 3/16/2004
Rep King, Peter T. [NY-3] - 3/25/2004 Rep King, Steve [IA-5] - 3/18/2004
Rep Kingston, Jack [GA-1] - 3/2/2004 Rep Kirk, Mark Steven [IL-10] - 11/20/2003
Rep Kline, John [MN-2] - 2/11/2004 Rep Knollenberg, Joe [MI-9] - 2/24/2004
Rep LaHood, Ray [IL-18] - 11/20/2003 Rep Lampson, Nick [TX-9] - 3/9/2004
Rep Langevin, James R. [RI-2] - 3/4/2004 Rep Larsen, Rick [WA-2] - 3/2/2004
Rep Larson, John B. [CT-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep Latham, Tom [IA-4] - 3/23/2004
Rep LaTourette, Steve C. [OH-14] - 3/24/2004 Rep Leach, James A. [IA-2] - 2/10/2004
Rep Levin, Sander M. [MI-12] - 2/24/2004 Rep Lewis, John [GA-5] - 3/30/2004
Rep LoBiondo, Frank A. [NJ-2] - 2/11/2004 Rep Lowey, Nita M. [NY-18] - 12/8/2003
Rep Lynch, Stephen F. [MA-9] - 4/20/2004 Rep Majette, Denise L. [GA-4] - 2/3/2004
Rep Maloney, Carolyn B. [NY-14] - 3/3/2004 Rep Matheson, Jim [UT-2] - 2/3/2004
Rep Matsui, Robert T. [CA-5] - 3/9/2004 Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] - 2/24/2004
Rep McCollum, Betty [MN-4] - 3/9/2004 Rep McCotter, Thaddeus G. [MI-11] - 2/3/2004
Rep McCrery, Jim [LA-4] - 3/3/2004 Rep McHugh, John M. [NY-23] - 2/24/2004
Rep McInnis, Scott [CO-3] - 2/10/2004 Rep McNulty, Michael R. [NY-21] - 1/28/2004
Rep Meehan, Martin T. [MA-5] - 3/23/2004 Rep Meek, Kendrick B. [FL-17] - 11/20/2003
Rep Menendez, Robert [NJ-13] - 3/2/2004 Rep Michaud, Michael H. [ME-2] - 1/21/2004
Rep Miller, Candice S. [MI-10] - 3/2/2004 Rep Miller, George [CA-7] - 3/2/2004
Rep Miller, Jeff [FL-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Moore, Dennis [KS-3] - 3/11/2004
Rep Murphy, Tim [PA-18] - 3/16/2004 Rep Musgrave, Marilyn N. [CO-4] - 2/4/2004
Rep Nadler, Jerrold [NY-8] - 3/2/2004 Rep Nethercutt, George R., Jr. [WA-5] - 2/24/2004
Rep Northup, Anne [KY-3] - 2/26/2004 Rep Norton, Eleanor Holmes [DC] - 3/24/2004
Rep Norwood, Charlie [GA-9] - 2/24/2004 Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] - 11/20/2003
Rep Nussle, Jim [IA-1] - 2/24/2004 Rep Olver, John W. [MA-1] - 3/30/2004
Rep Owens, Major R. [NY-11] - 3/2/2004 Rep Pallone, Frank, Jr. [NJ-6] - 3/9/2004
Rep Pascrell, Bill, Jr. [NJ-8] - 2/24/2004 Rep Pastor, Ed [AZ-4] - 3/30/2004
Rep Payne, Donald M. [NJ-10] - 2/26/2004 Rep Pelosi, Nancy [CA-8] - 3/4/2004
Rep Pence, Mike [IN-6] - 2/24/2004 Rep Pitts, Joseph R. [PA-16] - 3/30/2004
Rep Platts, Todd Russell [PA-19] - 2/24/2004 Rep Pombo, Richard W. [CA-11] - 2/4/2004
Rep Pomeroy, Earl [ND] - 3/18/2004 Rep Porter, Jon C. [NV-3] - 3/11/2004
Rep Portman, Rob [OH-2] - 3/24/2004 Rep Price, David E. [NC-4] - 3/18/2004
Rep Putnam, Adam H. [FL-12] - 2/26/2004 Rep Quinn, Jack [NY-27] - 3/25/2004
Rep Ramstad, Jim [MN-3] - 2/24/2004 Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] - 3/30/2004
Rep Rehberg, Dennis R. [MT] - 2/25/2004 Rep Renzi, Rick [AZ-1] - 3/30/2004
Rep Reynolds, Thomas M. [NY-26] - 3/2/2004 Rep Rodriguez, Ciro [TX-28] - 2/3/2004
Rep Rogers, Mike D. [AL-3] - 2/11/2004 Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [FL-18] - 2/10/2004
Rep Rothman, Steve R. [NJ-9] - 2/11/2004 Rep Ruppersberger, C. A. Dutch [MD-2] - 11/21/2003
Rep Rush, Bobby L. [IL-1] - 3/25/2004 Rep Ryan, Paul [WI-1] - 3/11/2004
Rep Ryun, Jim [KS-2] - 3/23/2004 Rep Sanchez, Linda T. [CA-39] - 3/18/2004
Rep Sanchez, Loretta [CA-47] - 4/28/2004 Rep Sandlin, Max [TX-1] - 3/23/2004
Rep Saxton, Jim [NJ-3] - 2/3/2004 Rep Schakowsky, Janice D. [IL-9] - 2/24/2004
Rep Schiff, Adam B. [CA-29] - 3/17/2004 Rep Schrock, Edward L. [VA-2] - 2/11/2004
Rep Scott, David [GA-13] - 2/3/2004 Rep Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. [WI-5] - 3/24/2004
Rep Sessions, Pete [TX-32] - 3/3/2004 Rep Shadegg, John B. [AZ-3] - 2/4/2004
Rep Shaw, E. Clay, Jr. [FL-22] - 11/20/2003 Rep Shays, Christopher [CT-4] - 3/2/2004
Rep Sherwood, Don [PA-10] - 3/4/2004 Rep Shimkus, John [IL-19] - 2/10/2004
Rep Simmons, Rob [CT-2] - 3/16/2004 Rep Skelton, Ike [MO-4] - 4/22/2004
Rep Slaughter, Louise McIntosh [NY-28] - 3/25/2004 Rep Smith, Adam [WA-9] - 3/30/2004
Rep Smith, Lamar [TX-21] - 3/23/2004 Rep Souder, Mark E. [IN-3] - 11/20/2003
Rep Stearns, Cliff [FL-6] - 3/2/2004 Rep Stupak, Bart [MI-1] - 4/28/2004
Rep Sullivan, John [OK-1] - 2/10/2004 Rep Sweeney, John E. [NY-20] - 2/10/2004
Rep Terry, Lee [NE-2] - 3/11/2004 Rep Tiberi, Patrick J. [OH-12] - 2/24/2004
Rep Toomey, Patrick J. [PA-15] - 3/16/2004 Rep Turner, Jim [TX-2] - 2/24/2004
Rep Udall, Mark [CO-2] - 3/11/2004 Rep Udall, Tom [NM-3] - 3/16/2004
Rep Upton, Fred [MI-6] - 3/2/2004 Rep Van Hollen, Chris [MD-8] - 3/18/2004
Rep Vitter, David [LA-1] - 2/10/2004 Rep Waxman, Henry A. [CA-30] - 2/10/2004
Rep Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] - 1/20/2004 Rep Weldon, Dave [FL-15] - 3/16/2004
Rep Weller, Jerry [IL-11] - 2/24/2004 Rep Wexler, Robert [FL-19] - 1/20/2004
Rep Wilson, Joe [SC-2] - 11/20/2003 Rep Wu, David [OR-1] - 2/26/2004
Rep Wynn, Albert Russell [MD-4] - 3/9/2004 Rep Young, Don [AK] - 4/2/2004
 
 
 
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SUMMARY AS OF:
11/20/2003--Introduced.
 
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards convention it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty).
 
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
 
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium conversion experiments.
 
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution, with particular attention to spent fuel.
 
Calls on the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Treaty.
 
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to meet its obligations to the IAEA.
 
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
 
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/20/2003:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
 
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE(S):
Committee/Subcommittee: Activity:
House International Relations Referral, In Committee
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELATED BILL DETAILS:  (additional related bills may be identified in Status)
Bill: Relationship:

S.CON.RES.81 Identical bill identified by CRS
 
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
H.CON.RES.332
Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003)      Cosponsors (230)
Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81
Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY AS OF:
11/20/2003--Introduced.
 
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards convention it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty).
 
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
 
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium conversion experiments.
 
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution, with particular attention to spent fuel.
 
Calls on the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Treaty.
 
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to meet its obligations to the IAEA.
 
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic... (Introduced in House)
HCON 332 IH
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES. 332

Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
November 20, 2003
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania (for himself, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. KIRK, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. CARDOZA, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. MEEK of Florida, Mr. NUNES, Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. CASE, Mr. DEUTSCH, and Mr. SHAW) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, Iran has committed itself to permanently abstaining from the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of nuclear weapons;
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;
Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;
Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003, that called on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran reached an agreement with 3 European foreign ministers in which it promised to extend full cooperation to the IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures, comport itself in accordance with the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities;
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to a variety of modern technologies and supplies once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the European foreign ministers to suspend enriching and processing uranium, Iran has explicitly indicated that it reserves the right to resume this activity at a time of its choosing;
Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it claims is a full statement about the nature of its nuclear activities, the IAEA has indicated it may take some months to fully evaluate the Iranian declaration, and IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has already stated that the documents show that Iran failed to comply with some of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted access to conduct inspections that the IAEA believes are necessary to resolve issues concerning Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran provided the IAEA with a declaration that it described as a complete and accurate history of its nuclear program;
Whereas Iran's National Security Council Chief, Hassan Rouhani, stated on October 21, 2003, that Iran was not prepared to abandon its uranium enrichment program, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on October 26, 2003, that it has not yet suspended uranium enrichment but was merely studying the issue;
Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile; and
Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, will continue to constitute a severe threat to international peace and security and to vital American national interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress--
(1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran for well over a decade to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
(2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S- Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 17, 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance that the explanations provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear activities are not credible;
(3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
(4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the Government of Iran and the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, but questions whether it signifies a sincere and lasting decision by the Government of Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program;
(5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with its obligations;
(6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
(A) urging the Government of Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and comply fully and unconditionally with the terms of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `IAEA resolution'), that calls on Iran to--
(i) provide the Agency a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program;
(ii) grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the Agency;
(iii) resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the Agency experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country;
(iv) provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments; and
(v) provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the Agency determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities; and
(B) taking such diplomatic measures as are necessary to encourage other nations, especially Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to urge the Government of Iran to fully and immediately comply with the such resolution;
(7) calls on Russia to--
(A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to accept in full the IAEA resolution;
(B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran, particularly the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the delivery of fuel for that reactor, until Iran fully and completely complies with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional Protocol;
(C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent fuel to Russia; and
(D) put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran cannot divert any spent fuel;
(8) calls on member states of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional Protocol;
(9) calls on the European Union to condition economic and commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by Iran with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and to stipulate that any rights that Iran obtains under such agreements will be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with the work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to acquire nuclear weapons;
(10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its own regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003, board meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for further action;
(11) calls on the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any violations report from the IAEA, to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a Security Council resolution, or take such other action that may be necessary to impose stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran; and
(12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program by--
(A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt and unconditional implementation of the Model Additional Protocol; and
(B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
A concurrent resolution expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/13/2003:
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of measure as introduced: CR 11/14/2003 S14818-14819)
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8795-8798)
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3569 Amendment SA 3569 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8796-8797; text: CR S8796-8797)
To provide a complete substitute.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8797-8798; text: CR S8797-8798)
To amend the preamble.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
To amend the title.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3569 Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE(S):
Committee/Subcommittee: Activity:
Senate Foreign Relations Referral, Discharged
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELATED BILL DETAILS:  (additional related bills may be indentified in Status)
Bill: Relationship:
H.CON.RES.332 Identical bill identified by CRS
 
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMENDMENT(S):
1. S.AMDT.3569 to S.CON.RES.81 To provide a complete substitute.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (3)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
2. S.AMDT.3570 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend the preamble.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
3. S.AMDT.3571 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COSPONSORS(69), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Allen, George [VA] - 1/22/2004 Sen Baucus, Max [MT] - 6/1/2004
Sen Bayh, Evan [IN] - 3/22/2004 Sen Bingaman, Jeff [NM] - 6/8/2004
Sen Bond, Christopher S. [MO] - 3/2/2004 Sen Breaux, John B. [LA] - 3/9/2004
Sen Brownback, Sam [KS] - 11/14/2003 Sen Bunning, Jim [KY] - 2/10/2004
Sen Cantwell, Maria [WA] - 3/22/2004 Sen Carper, Thomas R. [DE] - 3/10/2004
Sen Chambliss, Saxby [GA] - 4/19/2004 Sen Clinton, Hillary Rodham [NY] - 3/4/2004
Sen Cochran, Thad [MS] - 11/13/2003 Sen Coleman, Norm [MN] - 11/13/2003
Sen Collins, Susan M. [ME] - 2/23/2004 Sen Cornyn, John [TX] - 3/1/2004
Sen Corzine, Jon [NJ] - 11/19/2003 Sen Crapo, Michael D. [ID] - 11/18/2003
Sen Daschle, Thomas A. [SD] - 4/1/2004 Sen Dayton, Mark [MN] - 5/20/2004
Sen DeWine, Michael [OH] - 5/13/2004 Sen Dodd, Christopher J. [CT] - 2/24/2004
Sen Dole, Elizabeth H. [NC] - 3/1/2004 Sen Dorgan, Byron L. [ND] - 2/23/2004
Sen Durbin, Richard J. [IL] - 3/23/2004 Sen Ensign, John E. [NV] - 3/22/2004
Sen Feingold, Russell D. [WI] - 3/9/2004 Sen Fitzgerald, Peter [IL] - 11/13/2003
Sen Graham, Bob [FL] - 3/22/2004 Sen Grassley, Charles E. [IA] - 2/23/2004
Sen Gregg, Judd [NH] - 3/4/2004 Sen Hutchison, Kay Bailey [TX] - 5/17/2004
Sen Inhofe, Jim [OK] - 2/26/2004 Sen Inouye, Daniel K. [HI] - 4/20/2004
Sen Johnson, Tim [SD] - 2/11/2004 Sen Kerry, John F. [MA] - 4/20/2004
Sen Kohl, Herb [WI] - 5/18/2004 Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] - 11/13/2003
Sen Landrieu, Mary [LA] - 2/24/2004 Sen Lautenberg, Frank R. [NJ] - 11/13/2003
Sen Levin, Carl [MI] - 3/1/2004 Sen Lieberman, Joseph I. [CT] - 11/13/2003
Sen Lincoln, Blanche [AR] - 3/23/2004 Sen Lott, Trent [MS] - 2/25/2004
Sen McCain, John [AZ] - 4/19/2004 Sen McConnell, Mitch [KY] - 11/18/2003
Sen Mikulski, Barbara A. [MD] - 11/19/2003 Sen Miller, Zell [GA] - 11/20/2003
Sen Murkowski, Lisa [AK] - 12/9/2003 Sen Murray, Patty [WA] - 2/12/2004
Sen Nelson, Bill [FL] - 3/24/2004 Sen Nelson, E. Benjamin [NE] - 3/24/2004
Sen Nickles, Don [OK] - 2/26/2004 Sen Reid, Harry M. [NV] - 1/22/2004
Sen Roberts, Pat [KS] - 5/17/2004 Sen Santorum, Rick [PA] - 11/13/2003
Sen Schumer, Charles E. [NY] - 3/4/2004 Sen Sessions, Jeff [AL] - 3/30/2004
Sen Shelby, Richard C. [AL] - 2/24/2004 Sen Smith, Gordon [OR] - 2/25/2004
Sen Snowe, Olympia J. [ME] - 4/19/2004 Sen Specter, Arlen [PA] - 4/19/2004
Sen Stabenow, Debbie [MI] - 2/25/2004 Sen Stevens, Ted [AK] - 5/20/2004
Sen Sununu, John E. [NH] - 3/23/2004 Sen Talent, Jim [MO] - 2/24/2004
Sen Thomas, Craig [WY] - 3/22/2004 Sen Voinovich, George V. [OH] - 11/21/2003
Sen Wyden, Ron [OR] - 3/4/2004
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY AS OF:
11/13/2003--Introduced.
 
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
 
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
 
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium conversion experiments.
 
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution, with particular attention to spent fuel.
 
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to meet its obligations to the IAEA.
 
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
 
S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
A concurrent resolution expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/13/2003:
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of measure as introduced: CR 11/14/2003 S14818-14819)
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8795-8798)
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/13/2003:
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of measure as introduced: CR 11/14/2003 S14818-14819)
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8795-8798)
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3569 Amendment SA 3569 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8796-8797; text: CR S8796-8797)
To provide a complete substitute.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8797-8798; text: CR S8797-8798)
To amend the preamble.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
To amend the title.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3569 Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE(S):
Committee/Subcommittee: Activity:
Senate Foreign Relations Referral, Discharged
S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY AS OF:
11/13/2003--Introduced.
 
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
 
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
 
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium conversion experiments.
 
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution, with particular attention to spent fuel.
 
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to meet its obligations to the IAEA.
 
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program. There are 2 versions of Bill Number S.CON.RES.81 for the 108th Congress
1 . Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic... (Introduced in Senate)[S.CON.RES.81.IS]
 
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic... (Introduced in Senate)
 
SCON 81 IS
 

108th CONGRESS
 
1st Session
 
S. CON. RES. 81
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 
November 13 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 12), 2003
Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. KYL, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. FITZGERALD, and Mr. COCHRAN) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
 
Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
 
Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, Iran has committed itself to permanently abstaining from the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;
 
Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003, that called on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran reached an agreement with 3 European foreign ministers in which it promised to extend full cooperation to the IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures, comport itself in accordance with the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities;
 
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to a variety of modern technologies and supplies once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
 
Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the European foreign ministers to suspend enriching and processing uranium, Iran has explicitly indicated that it reserves the right to resume this activity at a time of its choosing;
 
Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it claims is a full statement about the nature of its nuclear activities, the IAEA has indicated it may take some months to fully evaluate the Iranian declaration, and IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has already stated that the documents show that Iran failed to comply with some of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted access to conduct inspections that the IAEA believes are necessary to resolve issues concerning Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran provided the IAEA with a declaration that it described as a complete and accurate history of its nuclear program;
 
Whereas Iran's National Security Council Chief, Hassan Rouhani, stated on October 21, 2003, that Iran was not prepared to abandon its uranium enrichment program, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on October 26, 2003, that it has not yet suspended uranium enrichment but was merely studying the issue;
 
Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile; and
 
Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, will continue to constitute a severe threat to international peace and security and to vital American national interests: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress--
 
(1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran for well over a decade to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
 
(2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S- Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 17, 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance that the explanations provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear activities are not credible;
 
(3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
 
(4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the Government of Iran and the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, but questions whether it signifies a sincere and lasting decision by the Government of Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program;
 
(5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with its obligations;
 
(6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
 
(A) urging the Government of Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and comply fully and unconditionally with the terms of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `IAEA resolution'), that calls on Iran to--
 
(i) provide the Agency a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program;
 
(ii) grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the Agency;
 
(iii) resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the Agency experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country;
 
(iv) provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments; and
 
(v) provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the Agency determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities; and
 
(B) taking such diplomatic measures as are necessary to encourage other nations, especially Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to urge the Government of Iran to fully and immediately comply with the such resolution;
 
(7) calls on Russia to--
 
(A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to accept in full the IAEA resolution;
 
(B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran, particularly the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the delivery of fuel for that reactor, until Iran fully and completely complies with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional Protocol;
 
(C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent fuel to Russia; and
 
(D) put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran cannot divert any spent fuel;
 
(8) calls on member states of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional Protocol;
 
(9) calls on the European Union to condition economic and commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by Iran with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and to stipulate that any rights that Iran obtains under such agreements will be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with the work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to acquire nuclear weapons;
 
(10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its own regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003, board meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for further action;
 
(11) calls on the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any violations report from the IAEA, to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a Security Council resolution, or take such other action that may be necessary to impose stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran; and
 
(12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program by--
 
(A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt and unconditional implementation of the Model Additional Protocol; and
 
(B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2 . Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including... (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)[S.CON.RES.81.ES]
 

Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including... (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)
 
SCON 81 ES
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
S. CON. RES. 81
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that `all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery';
 
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous times on persons and entities transferring equipment and technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass destruction programs;
 
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty");
 
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, including those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
 
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards (the `Additional Protocol') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran `had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 percent';
 
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information that should have been provided, including the fact that `some samples from' the laser uranium enrichment project `had been sent for assessment to the supplier's laboratory';
 
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium contamination at that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge components and perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
 
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, report, that `the contamination is different on domestic and imported centrifuges,' that `it is unlikely' that the 36 percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired from Iran's principal supplier country, and that `important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory information';
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community of full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 

(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented, would undercut the international effort to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution,' and also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment activities `does not include suspension of production of UF6,' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 2004, which was also adopted unanimously, `deplores' the fact that `Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been' and `underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons';
 
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran's suspension `commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings';
 
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
 
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, which called on Iran `to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities,' and Iran's voluntary suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear weapon design to another country, its production of centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons; and
 
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and threaten United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress--
 
(1) condemns--
 
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
 
(B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
 
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'), including the United States, to use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Additional Protocol') and is clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs between the United States and Libya;
 
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its support for international terrorist organizations;
 
(9) notes the assistance that the United States has provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on December 26, 2003;
 
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing of related equipment;
 
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international commitments and to rescind its decisions--
 
(A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
 
(B) to produce feed material that could be used in those centrifuges; and
 
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could be used for plutonium production;
 
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and legal obligations--
 
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted access;
 
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities; and
 
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European Union and the United States pledged to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies actions states should take--
 
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
 
(B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
 
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(14) urges close cooperation between the United States and the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in their June 26, 2004, declaration of `the IAEA Board of Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities';
 
(15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(16) further calls upon the members of the European Union to undertake such additional measures, including imposing sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or suspend all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon Russia--
 
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
 
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor that would enter into force before Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
 
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
 
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, sites, and information related to the investigations;
 
(C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
 
(D) to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
 
(A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA; and
 
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance is uncertain;
 
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the `proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,' to consider measures necessary--
 
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
 
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities;
 
(22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
 
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states assured and affordable access to--
 
(A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in peaceful nuclear activities; and
 
(B) spent fuel management; and
 
(25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Passed the Senate July 22, 2004.
 
Attest:
 
Secretary.
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
S. CON. RES. 81
 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Amendments For S.CON.RES.81
1. S.AMDT.3569 to S.CON.RES.81 To provide a complete substitute.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (3)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.AMDT.3569
Amends: S.CON.RES.81
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
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COSPONSORS(3), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004 Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
 
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2. S.AMDT.3570 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend the preamble.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 

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3. S.AMDT.3571 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
 

S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)      Cosponsors (69)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
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RELATED BILL DETAILS:  (additional related bills may be identified in Status)
Bill: Relationship:
H.CON.RES.332 Identical bill identified by CRS

http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/iraqwar.html
http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/iraqwar.html#comppolicy
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H.CON.RES.398
 
 
This was (H.Con.Res.398), a concurrent resolution passed after Congress passed Resolution 332. These resolutions stated clearly a deep concern by the Congress that a sovereign nation which disclosed under international law as well as legal for a sovereign nation to possess these weapons for defensive means has taken umbrage over Iran's development to acquire the means to produce nuclear weapons. The United States has the most nuclear weapons and never has relented in trying not to procure less of those deadly weapons but happens to increase how it conducts the arms race even after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress
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H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
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TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 

Amendments For H.CON.RES.398
1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (3)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
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2. S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 

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3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. Amendments For H.CON.RES.398
1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (3)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
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S.AMDT.3572
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
 
S.AMDT.3573
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
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COSPONSORS(1), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
 

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COSPONSORS(3), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004 Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
 
 S.AMDT.3572
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
 
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8782-8783
 
STATUS:
 
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(3):
 
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004
 
 
 
 
 
S.AMDT.3574
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
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COSPONSORS(1), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
 
 
 
 
 
2. S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.AMDT.3573
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To amend the preamble.
 
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8783-8785
 
STATUS:
 
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(1):
 
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
 
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3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.AMDT.3574
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To amend the title.
 
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8785
 
STATUS:
 
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(1):
 
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(51), ALPHABETICAL
[followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)Ackerman, Gary L. [NY-5] - 3/25/2004 Rep Baird, Brian [WA-3] - 5/6/2004 
Rep Bereuter, Doug [NE-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Berkley, Shelley [NV-1] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Berman, Howard L. [CA-28] - 3/25/2004 Rep Biggert, Judy [IL-13] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Blackburn, Marsha [TN-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep Blunt, Roy [MO-7] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Boozman, John [AR-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Burton, Dan [IN-5] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Carson, Brad [OK-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Carter, John R. [TX-31] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] - 3/25/2004 Rep Chandler, Ben [KY-6] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr. [AL-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Engel, Eliot L. [NY-17] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Etheridge, Bob [NC-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Feeney, Tom [FL-24] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Frank, Barney [MA-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Harris, Katherine [FL-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoeffel, Joseph M. [PA-13] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Hooley, Darlene [OR-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoyer, Steny H. [MD-5] - 5/5/2004 
Rep Kelly, Sue W. [NY-19] - 5/4/2004 Rep King, Peter T. [NY-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Lampson, Nick [TX-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Lantos, Tom [CA-12] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Markey, Edward J. [MA-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] - 5/5/2004 
Rep McCotter, Thaddeus G. [MI-11] - 5/4/2004 Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Pence, Mike [IN-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Pickering, Charles W. (Chip) [MS-3] - 5/5/2004 
Rep Pitts, Joseph R. [PA-16] - 5/4/2004 Rep Porter, Jon C. [NV-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Price, David E. [NC-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Ramstad, Jim [MN-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Renzi, Rick [AZ-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [FL-18] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Schiff, Adam B. [CA-29] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sherman, Brad [CA-27] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Smith, Christopher H. [NJ-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Souder, Mark E. [IN-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Strickland, Ted [OH-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sullivan, John [OK-1] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Tauscher, Ellen O. [CA-10] - 5/4/2004 Rep Terry, Lee [NE-2] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Weller, Jerry [IL-11] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Wexler, Robert [FL-19] - 5/4/2004
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
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Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
 
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TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
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STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
3/25/2004:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
3/31/2004:
Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote.
5/5/2004 6:28pm:
Mr. Burton (IN) moved to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution.
5/5/2004 6:29pm:
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2617-2623)
5/5/2004 7:05pm:
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.
5/6/2004 3:15pm:
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
5/6/2004:
Received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3572 Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
To amend the preamble.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
To amend the title.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3572 Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 

Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress
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H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
3/25/2004:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
3/31/2004:
Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote.
5/5/2004 6:28pm:
Mr. Burton (IN) moved to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution.
5/5/2004 6:29pm:
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2617-2623)
5/5/2004 7:05pm:
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.
5/6/2004 3:15pm:
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
5/6/2004:
Received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
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SUMMARY AS OF:
5/6/2004--Passed House, without amendment.    (There is 1 other summary)
 
(This measure has not been amended since it was introduced. The summary of that version is repeated here.)
 
States that Congress: (1) condemns Iran's continuing deceptions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities, and demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and cease nuclear enrichment activities; (2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards; (3) calls upon all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; (4) urges the IAEA Board of Governors to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements; (5) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under NPT who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities; (6) urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures to support IAEA inspection efforts; and (7) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. There are 4 versions of Bill Number H.CON.RES.398 for the 108th Congress
1 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)[H.CON.RES.398.IH]
 
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)
 
HCON 398 IH
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 
March 25, 2004
Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN, and Mr. CHABOT) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
 
 
 
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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
 
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
 
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
 
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
 
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
 
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
 
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
 
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
 
 
 
 
 
2 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate Committee after being Received from House)[H.CON.RES.398.RFS]
 
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate Committee after being Received from House)
 
HCON 398 RFS
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 
May 6, 2004
Received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
 
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
 
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
 
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
 
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
 
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
 
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
 
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
 
Attest:
 
JEFF TRANDAHL,
 
Clerk.
 
3 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)[H.CON.RES.398.EH]
 

Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
HCON 398 EH
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
 
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
 
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
 
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
 
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
 
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
 
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
 
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
 
Attest:
 
Clerk
4 . Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)[H.CON.RES.398.EAS]
 
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)
 
HCON 398 EAS
 

In the Senate of the United States,
 
July 22, 2004.
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.', do pass with the following
 
AMENDMENTS:
 

( 1 ) Page 1, strike out the preamble and insert:
Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that `all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery';
 
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous times on persons and entities transferring equipment and technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass destruction programs;
 
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
 
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, including those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
 
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards (the `Additional Protocol') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran `had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 percent';
 
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information that should have been provided, including the fact that `some samples from' the laser uranium enrichment project `had been sent for assessment to the supplier's laboratory';
 
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium contamination at that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge components and perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
 
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, report, that `the contamination is different on domestic and imported centrifuges,' that `it is unlikely' that the 36 percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired from Iran's principal supplier country, and that `important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory information';
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community of full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 

(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented, would undercut the international effort to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution,' and also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment activities `does not include suspension of production of UF6,' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 2004, which was also adopted unanimously, `deplores' the fact that `Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been' and `underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons';
 
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran's suspension `commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings';
 
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
 
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, which called on Iran `to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities,' and Iran's voluntary suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear weapon design to another country, its production of centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons; and
 
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and threaten United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
 
( 2 ) Page 8, line 2, strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:
 
That Congress--
 
(1) condemns--
 
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
 
(B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
 
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'), including the United States, to use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Additional Protocol') and is clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs between the United States and Libya;
 
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its support for international terrorist organizations;
 
(9) notes the assistance that the United States has provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on December 26, 2003;
 
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing of related equipment;
 
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international commitments and to rescind its decisions--
 
(A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
 
(B) to produce feed material that could be used in those centrifuges; and
 
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could be used for plutonium production;
 
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and legal obligations--
 
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted access;
 
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities; and
 
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European Union and the United States pledged to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies actions states should take--
 
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
 
(B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
 
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(14) urges close cooperation between the United States and the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in their June 26, 2004, declaration of `the IAEA Board of Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities';
 
(15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(16) further calls upon the members of the European Union to undertake such additional measures, including imposing sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or suspend all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon Russia--
 
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
 
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor that would enter into force before Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
 
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
 
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, sites, and information related to the investigations;
 
(C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
 
(D) to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
 
(A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA; and
 
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance is uncertain;
 
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the `proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,' to consider measures necessary--
 
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
 
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities;
 
(22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
 
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states assured and affordable access to--
 
(A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in peaceful nuclear activities; and
 
(B) spent fuel management; and
 
(25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Amend the title so as to read: `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.'.
 
Attest:
 
Secretary.
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 
AMENDMENTS
H. CON. RES. 398: EXPRESSING THE CONCERN OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- HON. RON PAUL (Extensions of Remarks - May 17, 2004)
 

[Page: E877]  GPO's PDF
---
 
HON. RON PAUL
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 17, 2004
 
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this ill-conceived and ill-timed legislation. Let's not fool ourselves: this concurrent resolution leads us down the road to war against Iran. It creates a precedent for future escalation, as did similar legislation endorsing ``regime change'' in Iraq back in 1998.
 
I find it incomprehensible that as the failure of our Iraq policy becomes more evident--even to its most determined advocates--we here are approving the same kind of policy toward Iran. With Iraq becoming more of a problem daily, the solution as envisioned by this legislation is to look for yet another fight. And we should not fool ourselves: this legislation sets the stage for direct conflict with Iran. The resolution ``calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons .....'' Note the phrase ``use all appropriate means.''
 
Additionally, this legislation calls for yet more and stricter sanctions on Iran, including a demand that other countries also impose sanctions on Iran. As we know, sanctions are unmistakably a move toward war, particularly when, as in this legislation, a demand is made that the other nations of the world similarly isolate and blockade the country. Those who wish for a regime change in Iran should especially reject sanctions--just look at how our Cuba policy has allowed Fidel Castro to maintain his hold on power for decades. Sanctions do not hurt political leaders, as we know most recently from our sanctions against Iraq, but rather sow misery among the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society. Dictators do not go hungry when sanctions are imposed.
 
It is somewhat ironic that vie are again meddling in Iranian affairs. Students of history will recall that the U.S. government's ill-advised coup against Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and its subsequent installation of the Shah as the supreme ruler led to intense hatred of the United States and eventually to the radical Islamic revolution of 1979. One can only wonder what our relations would be with Iran if not for the decades of meddling in that country's internal affairs. We likely would not be considering resolutions such as this. Yet the solution to all the difficulties created by our meddling foreign policy always seems to be yet more meddling. Will Congress ever learn?
 
I urge my colleagues to reject this move toward war with Iran, to reject the failed policies of regime-change and nation-building, and to return to the wise and consistent policy of non-interventionism in the affairs of other sovereign nations. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 152
(Republicans in roman; Democrats in italic; Independents underlined)
 
H CON RES 398 2/3 YEA-AND-NAY 6-May-2004 3:19 PM
QUESTION: On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree
BILL TITLE: Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of the means to produce nuclear weapons
 
  \l "Y"  \l "N"  \l "P"  \l "NV"
Republican 203 1  23
Democratic 172 2 14 17
Independent 1   
TOTALS 376 3 14 40
 

---- YEAS    376 ---
 
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Ballance
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bonner
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Fattah
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
 Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Grijalva
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Majette
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCotter
McGovern
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
 Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sánchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
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Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
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Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
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Shuster
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Simpson
Skelton
Slaughter
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Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
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Tanner
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Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
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Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Turner (OH)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
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Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
 
 
 
 
 
 


---- NAYS 3 ---
Conyers
 Kucinich
 Paul
 
 
 
---- ANSWERED "PRESENT" 14 ---
Capuano
Filner
Hinchey
Kanjorski
Lee
 McDermott
Miller, George
Mollohan
Rahall
Serrano
 Stark
Waters
Watson
Woolsey
 

---- NOT VOTING 40 ---
Baca
Ballenger
Berkley
Blunt
Boehner
Bono
Boyd
Burgess
Cole
Davis, Jo Ann
Delahunt
DeMint
Doyle
Farr
 Feeney
Gephardt
Granger
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hastings (WA)
Hunter
Jenkins
John
Latham
Lewis (KY)
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
 McNulty
Meeks (NY)
Neal (MA)
Oxley
Peterson (PA)
Reyes
Solis
Spratt
Tauzin
Turner (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Young (FL)
 
 
 
Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress
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H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 

Amendments For H.CON.RES.398
1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (3)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
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2. S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. Amendments For H.CON.RES.398
1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (3)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S.AMDT.3572
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
 
S.AMDT.3573
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COSPONSORS(1), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
 

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COSPONSORS(3), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004 Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
 
 S.AMDT.3572
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
 
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8782-8783
 
STATUS:
 
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(3):
 
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004
 
 
 
 
 
S.AMDT.3574
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COSPONSORS(1), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
 
2. S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.AMDT.3573
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To amend the preamble.
 
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8783-8785
 
STATUS:
 
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(1):
 
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)      Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
 
S.AMDT.3574
Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To amend the title.
 
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8785
 
STATUS:
 
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
7/22/2004:
Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(1):
 
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
COSPONSORS(51), ALPHABETICAL
[followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]:     (Sort: by date)Ackerman, Gary L. [NY-5] - 3/25/2004 Rep Baird, Brian [WA-3] - 5/6/2004 
Rep Bereuter, Doug [NE-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Berkley, Shelley [NV-1] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Berman, Howard L. [CA-28] - 3/25/2004 Rep Biggert, Judy [IL-13] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Blackburn, Marsha [TN-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep Blunt, Roy [MO-7] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Boozman, John [AR-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Burton, Dan [IN-5] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Carson, Brad [OK-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Carter, John R. [TX-31] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] - 3/25/2004 Rep Chandler, Ben [KY-6] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr. [AL-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Engel, Eliot L. [NY-17] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Etheridge, Bob [NC-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Feeney, Tom [FL-24] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Frank, Barney [MA-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Harris, Katherine [FL-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoeffel, Joseph M. [PA-13] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Hooley, Darlene [OR-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoyer, Steny H. [MD-5] - 5/5/2004 
Rep Kelly, Sue W. [NY-19] - 5/4/2004 Rep King, Peter T. [NY-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Lampson, Nick [TX-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Lantos, Tom [CA-12] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Markey, Edward J. [MA-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] - 5/5/2004 
Rep McCotter, Thaddeus G. [MI-11] - 5/4/2004 Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Pence, Mike [IN-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Pickering, Charles W. (Chip) [MS-3] - 5/5/2004 
Rep Pitts, Joseph R. [PA-16] - 5/4/2004 Rep Porter, Jon C. [NV-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Price, David E. [NC-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Ramstad, Jim [MN-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Renzi, Rick [AZ-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [FL-18] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Schiff, Adam B. [CA-29] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sherman, Brad [CA-27] - 3/25/2004 
Rep Smith, Christopher H. [NJ-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Souder, Mark E. [IN-3] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Strickland, Ted [OH-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sullivan, John [OK-1] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Tauscher, Ellen O. [CA-10] - 5/4/2004 Rep Terry, Lee [NE-2] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Weller, Jerry [IL-11] - 5/4/2004 
Rep Wexler, Robert [FL-19] - 5/4/2004
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE(S):  (italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
3/25/2004:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
3/31/2004:
Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote.
5/5/2004 6:28pm:
Mr. Burton (IN) moved to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution.
5/5/2004 6:29pm:
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2617-2623)
5/5/2004 7:05pm:
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.
5/6/2004 3:15pm:
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
5/6/2004:
Received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3572 Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798)
To amend the preamble.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
To amend the title.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3572 Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
 

Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
3/25/2004:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
3/31/2004:
Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote.
5/5/2004 6:28pm:
Mr. Burton (IN) moved to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution.
5/5/2004 6:29pm:
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2617-2623)
5/5/2004 7:05pm:
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.
5/6/2004 3:15pm:
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
5/6/2004 3:20pm:
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
5/6/2004:
Received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
7/22/2004:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004:
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004:
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)      Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
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SUMMARY AS OF:
5/6/2004--Passed House, without amendment.    (There is 1 other summary)
 
(This measure has not been amended since it was introduced. The summary of that version is repeated here.)
 
States that Congress: (1) condemns Iran's continuing deceptions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities, and demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and cease nuclear enrichment activities; (2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards; (3) calls upon all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; (4) urges the IAEA Board of Governors to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements; (5) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under NPT who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities; (6) urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures to support IAEA inspection efforts; and (7) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. There are 4 versions of Bill Number H.CON.RES.398 for the 108th Congress
1 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)[H.CON.RES.398.IH]
 
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)
 
HCON 398 IH
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 
March 25, 2004
Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN, and Mr. CHABOT) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
 
 
 
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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
 
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
 
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
 
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
 
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
 
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
 
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
 
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
 
 
 
 
 
2 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate Committee after being Received from House)[H.CON.RES.398.RFS]
 
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate Committee after being Received from House)
 
HCON 398 RFS
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 
May 6, 2004
Received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
 
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
 
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
 
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
 
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
 
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
 
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
 
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
 
Attest:
 
JEFF TRANDAHL,
 
Clerk.
 
3 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)[H.CON.RES.398.EH]
 

Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
 
HCON 398 EH
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
 
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
 
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
 
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
 
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
 
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
 
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
 
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
 
Attest:
 
Clerk
4 . Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)[H.CON.RES.398.EAS]
 
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)
 
HCON 398 EAS
 

In the Senate of the United States,
 
July 22, 2004.
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.', do pass with the following
 
AMENDMENTS:
 

( 1 ) Page 1, strike out the preamble and insert:
Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that `all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery';
 
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous times on persons and entities transferring equipment and technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass destruction programs;
 
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
 
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per year;
 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, including those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
 
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards (the `Additional Protocol') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
 
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride;
 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran `had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 percent';
 
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information that should have been provided, including the fact that `some samples from' the laser uranium enrichment project `had been sent for assessment to the supplier's laboratory';
 
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
 
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
 
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium contamination at that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge components and perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
 
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, report, that `the contamination is different on domestic and imported centrifuges,' that `it is unlikely' that the 36 percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired from Iran's principal supplier country, and that `important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory information';
 
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community of full transparency;
 
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
 
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
 

(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
 
(2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
 
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
 
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented, would undercut the international effort to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution,' and also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
 
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
 
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment activities `does not include suspension of production of UF6,' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 2004, which was also adopted unanimously, `deplores' the fact that `Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been' and `underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons';
 
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran's suspension `commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings';
 
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
 
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, which called on Iran `to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities,' and Iran's voluntary suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
 
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear weapon design to another country, its production of centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons; and
 
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and threaten United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
 
( 2 ) Page 8, line 2, strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:
 
That Congress--
 
(1) condemns--
 
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
 
(B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
 
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
 
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
 
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'), including the United States, to use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Additional Protocol') and is clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
 
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
 
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs between the United States and Libya;
 
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its support for international terrorist organizations;
 
(9) notes the assistance that the United States has provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on December 26, 2003;
 
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing of related equipment;
 
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international commitments and to rescind its decisions--
 
(A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
 
(B) to produce feed material that could be used in those centrifuges; and
 
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could be used for plutonium production;
 
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and legal obligations--
 
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted access;
 
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities; and
 
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
 
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European Union and the United States pledged to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies actions states should take--
 
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
 
(B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
 
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(14) urges close cooperation between the United States and the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in their June 26, 2004, declaration of `the IAEA Board of Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities';
 
(15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(16) further calls upon the members of the European Union to undertake such additional measures, including imposing sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
 
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
 
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
 
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or suspend all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
 
(D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 
(18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon Russia--
 
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
 
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor that would enter into force before Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
 
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
 
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
 
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, sites, and information related to the investigations;
 
(C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
 
(D) to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
 
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
 
(A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA; and
 
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance is uncertain;
 
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the `proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,' to consider measures necessary--
 
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
 
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities;
 
(22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
 
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
 
(24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states assured and affordable access to--
 
(A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in peaceful nuclear activities; and
 
(B) spent fuel management; and
 
(25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
Amend the title so as to read: `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.'.
 
Attest:
 
Secretary.
 

108th CONGRESS
 
2d Session
 
H. CON. RES. 398
 
AMENDMENTS
H. CON. RES. 398: EXPRESSING THE CONCERN OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- HON. RON PAUL (Extensions of Remarks - May 17, 2004)
 

[Page: E877]  GPO's PDF
---
 
HON. RON PAUL
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 17, 2004
 
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this ill-conceived and ill-timed legislation. Let's not fool ourselves: this concurrent resolution leads us down the road to war against Iran. It creates a precedent for future escalation, as did similar legislation endorsing ``regime change'' in Iraq back in 1998.
 
I find it incomprehensible that as the failure of our Iraq policy becomes more evident--even to its most determined advocates--we here are approving the same kind of policy toward Iran. With Iraq becoming more of a problem daily, the solution as envisioned by this legislation is to look for yet another fight. And we should not fool ourselves: this legislation sets the stage for direct conflict with Iran. The resolution ``calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons .....'' Note the phrase ``use all appropriate means.''
 
Additionally, this legislation calls for yet more and stricter sanctions on Iran, including a demand that other countries also impose sanctions on Iran. As we know, sanctions are unmistakably a move toward war, particularly when, as in this legislation, a demand is made that the other nations of the world similarly isolate and blockade the country. Those who wish for a regime change in Iran should especially reject sanctions--just look at how our Cuba policy has allowed Fidel Castro to maintain his hold on power for decades. Sanctions do not hurt political leaders, as we know most recently from our sanctions against Iraq, but rather sow misery among the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society. Dictators do not go hungry when sanctions are imposed.
 
It is somewhat ironic that vie are again meddling in Iranian affairs. Students of history will recall that the U.S. government's ill-advised coup against Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and its subsequent installation of the Shah as the supreme ruler led to intense hatred of the United States and eventually to the radical Islamic revolution of 1979. One can only wonder what our relations would be with Iran if not for the decades of meddling in that country's internal affairs. We likely would not be considering resolutions such as this. Yet the solution to all the difficulties created by our meddling foreign policy always seems to be yet more meddling. Will Congress ever learn?
 
I urge my colleagues to reject this move toward war with Iran, to reject the failed policies of regime-change and nation-building, and to return to the wise and consistent policy of non-interventionism in the affairs of other sovereign nations. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 152
(Republicans in roman; Democrats in italic; Independents underlined)
 
H CON RES 398 2/3 YEA-AND-NAY 6-May-2004 3:19 PM
QUESTION: On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree
BILL TITLE: Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of the means to produce nuclear weapons
 
  \l "Y"  \l "N"  \l "P"  \l "NV"
Republican 203 1  23
Democratic 172 2 14 17
Independent 1   
TOTALS 376 3 14 40
 

---- YEAS    376 ---
 
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Ballance
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bonner
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Fattah
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
 Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Grijalva
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Majette
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCotter
McGovern
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
 Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sánchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Turner (OH)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velázquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
 
 
 
 
 
 


---- NAYS 3 ---
Conyers
 Kucinich
 Paul
 
 
 
---- ANSWERED "PRESENT" 14 ---
Capuano
Filner
Hinchey
Kanjorski
Lee
 McDermott
Miller, George
Mollohan
Rahall
Serrano
 Stark
Waters
Watson
Woolsey
 

---- NOT VOTING 40 ---
Baca
Ballenger
Berkley
Blunt
Boehner
Bono
Boyd
Burgess
Cole
Davis, Jo Ann
Delahunt
DeMint
Doyle
Farr
 Feeney
Gephardt
Granger
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hastings (WA)
Hunter
Jenkins
John
Latham
Lewis (KY)
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
 McNulty
Meeks (NY)
Neal (MA)
Oxley
Peterson (PA)
Reyes
Solis
Spratt
Tauzin
Turner (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Young (FL)

Past Nobel Laureate Nominee Kathy Kelly!
kathykellyauton9.jpg
Kathy Kelly with Iraqi children prior to the "shock & awe" savage bombings in March of 2003

VITW Voices in the Wilderness www.nonviolence.org/vitw/

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This is a picture of peace activist Kathy Kelly in Iraq before the bombs away by the"shock and awe" of the Bush administration which would target way too many children for any sane, rational or moral person to agree with in their new "preventive war" doctrine. Shame on Mr. Bush and praise to Kathy Kelly and the Voices in the Wilderness. go to vitw.org and become familiar with the true Christians in America! The Bush administration should be commended for their intelligent war effort and great war plan as American soldiers have been treated to rose petals and warm tea ever since the shock and awe descended on Baghdad in mid-March of 2003. President George W. Bush must always be praised and never criticized for his awesome insight into the situation in Iraq before and after the war was "won." President Bush since the "Mission Accomplished" speech has seen less soldiers killed than at any other time of the war because technically speaking no war exists except that American soldiers are still fighting for Uncle Sam in Babylon. I think Religious Wars, even waged by fine men like Mr. Bush should be protested!!!!! Keep the anti-war protests up before Mr. Bush gets any wild ideas of bringing forth a nuclear armageddon to satisfy the "Last Days" wing of the extreme right of the Republican party who seem to think the end days are near if not here & Bush will be the right man on the job, nuclear button and nuclear weapons to pull it off for them. So, take a deep breathe and support peace activists over war activists so we can live a few more years here on God's earth before man destroys it completely with man-made secular weapons which are truly unnatural creations not of God's making but of man's Don't let anyone fool ya. Lots of liars and propagandists and fallacious stories of morality and religion out there by demagogues often ready to talk in riddles and lies to sell  you their take on things which are often twisted worse than any horror movie!

 
 
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