H.CON.RES.332
The United States Congress passed the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime.
It took the United States government only five years before the operation of "shock and awe" was started. As Bush declared
both Iraq and Iran as part of the "axis of evil" with North Korea, the Congress has put into effect the same type of bill
or measure in terms of a resolution, not a bonafide bill to attack Iran. The following is a shocking but startling look at
the provisions of the bill and the like. It should be noted that anti-war "proponents" like Dennis Kucinich voted for these
resoultions just as he did in 1998 for the Iraqi Liberation Act. Kucinich has been exposed for the double-talker he is! And
many more like him show up in this latest pro-war bill by the United States government. Here it is folks:
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor:
Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest
Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S): (italics indicate
a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement
by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest
Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor:
Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest
Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S): (italics indicate
a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement
by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/20/2003: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE(S): Committee/Subcommittee:
Activity: House International Relations Referral, In Committee
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELATED BILL
DETAILS: (additional related bills may be indentified in Status) Bill: Relationship: S.CON.RES.81 Identical bill
identified by CRS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AMENDMENT(S): ***NONE***
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(230),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Rep Aderholt,
Robert B. [AL-4] - 3/23/2004 Rep Akin, W. Todd [MO-2] - 2/24/2004 Rep Alexander, Rodney [LA-5] - 2/3/2004 Rep Allen, Thomas
H. [ME-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Andrews, Robert E. [NJ-1] - 11/21/2003 Rep Baca, Joe [CA-43] - 3/2/2004 Rep Bachus, Spencer
[AL-6] - 2/11/2004 Rep Baker, Richard H. [LA-6] - 2/10/2004 Rep Ballance, Frank W., Jr. [NC-1] - 3/11/2004 Rep Barrett,
J. Gresham [SC-3] - 3/23/2004 Rep Bass, Charles F. [NH-2] - 2/3/2004 Rep Beauprez, Bob [CO-7] - 2/24/2004 Rep Bell,
Chris [TX-25] - 2/10/2004 Rep Berkley, Shelley [NV-1] - 2/24/2004 Rep Berman, Howard L. [CA-28] - 11/20/2003 Rep Bishop,
Rob [UT-1] - 3/2/2004 Rep Bishop, Sanford D., Jr. [GA-2] - 3/16/2004 Rep Bishop, Timothy H. [NY-1] - 3/16/2004 Rep
Boehlert, Sherwood L. [NY-24] - 3/9/2004 Rep Bonilla, Henry [TX-23] - 2/11/2004 Rep Bonner, Jo [AL-1] - 2/11/2004 Rep
Boswell, Leonard L. [IA-3] - 3/23/2004 Rep Bradley, Jeb [NH-1] - 1/20/2004 Rep Brady, Robert [PA-1] - 3/23/2004 Rep
Brown, Corrine [FL-3] - 4/20/2004 Rep Brown, Henry E., Jr. [SC-1] - 3/18/2004 Rep Brown, Sherrod [OH-13] - 3/30/2004 Rep
Burgess, Michael C. [TX-26] - 3/30/2004 Rep Burns, Max [GA-12] - 2/24/2004 Rep Burr, Richard [NC-5] - 2/24/2004 Rep
Burton, Dan [IN-5] - 2/11/2004 Rep Camp, Dave [MI-4] - 4/2/2004 Rep Cantor, Eric [VA-7] - 2/24/2004 Rep Cardin, Benjamin
L. [MD-3] - 3/2/2004 Rep Cardoza, Dennis A. [CA-18] - 11/20/2003 Rep Carson, Brad [OK-2] - 2/4/2004 Rep Case, Ed [HI-2]
- 11/20/2003 Rep Castle, Michael N. [DE] - 3/9/2004 Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Chandler, Ben [KY-6] - 3/2/2004
Rep Chocola, Chris [IN-2] - 3/10/2004 Rep Clay, Wm. Lacy [MO-1] - 2/25/2004 Rep Coble, Howard [NC-6] - 3/30/2004 Rep
Cole, Tom [OK-4] - 11/21/2003 Rep Cooper, Jim [TN-5] - 2/3/2004 Rep Costello, Jerry F. [IL-12] - 2/26/2004 Rep Cox,
Christopher [CA-48] - 2/24/2004 Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr. [AL-5] - 4/22/2004 Rep Crane, Philip M. [IL-8] - 3/4/2004
Rep Crenshaw, Ander [FL-4] - 6/18/2004 Rep Crowley, Joseph [NY-7] - 2/24/2004 Rep Culberson, John Abney [TX-7] - 3/24/2004
Rep Davis, Artur [AL-7] - 2/25/2004 Rep Davis, Danny K. [IL-7] - 5/5/2004 Rep Davis, Jim [FL-11] - 4/20/2004 Rep Davis,
Jo Ann [VA-1] - 2/26/2004 Rep Davis, Lincoln [TN-4] - 2/10/2004 Rep Davis, Tom [VA-11] - 3/23/2004 Rep DeGette, Diana
[CO-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Deutsch, Peter [FL-20] - 11/20/2003 Rep Diaz-Balart, Lincoln [FL-21] - 3/23/2004 Rep Diaz-Balart,
Mario [FL-25] - 3/16/2004 Rep Doolittle, John T. [CA-4] - 3/16/2004 Rep Edwards, Chet [TX-11] - 2/24/2004 Rep Ehlers,
Vernon J. [MI-3] - 3/23/2004 Rep Emanuel, Rahm [IL-5] - 2/3/2004 Rep Emerson, Jo Ann [MO-8] - 3/10/2004 Rep Engel, Eliot
L. [NY-17] - 3/9/2004 Rep Eshoo, Anna G. [CA-14] - 3/24/2004 Rep Evans, Lane [IL-17] - 2/24/2004 Rep Feeney, Tom [FL-24]
- 12/8/2003 Rep Ferguson, Mike [NJ-7] - 2/11/2004 Rep Filner, Bob [CA-51] - 3/25/2004 Rep Foley, Mark [FL-16] - 5/5/2004
Rep Ford, Harold E., Jr. [TN-9] - 3/3/2004 Rep Fossella, Vito [NY-13] - 3/10/2004 Rep Franks, Trent [AZ-2] - 3/3/2004
Rep Frost, Martin [TX-24] - 1/20/2004 Rep Garrett, Scott [NJ-5] - 2/24/2004 Rep Gerlach, Jim [PA-6] - 3/3/2004 Rep
Gordon, Bart [TN-6] - 1/20/2004 Rep Green, Gene [TX-29] - 2/4/2004 Rep Green, Mark [WI-8] - 2/25/2004 Rep Greenwood, James
C. [PA-8] - 2/10/2004 Rep Gutierrez, Luis V. [IL-4] - 3/9/2004 Rep Gutknecht, Gil [MN-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep Harman, Jane
[CA-36] - 11/20/2003 Rep Harris, Katherine [FL-13] - 3/30/2004 Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [FL-23] - 3/18/2004 Rep Hayes, Robin
[NC-8] - 3/23/2004 Rep Hefley, Joel [CO-5] - 2/24/2004 Rep Herger, Wally [CA-2] - 2/24/2004 Rep Hill, Baron P. [IN-9]
- 3/3/2004 Rep Hoeffel, Joseph M. [PA-13] - 3/16/2004 Rep Holden, Tim [PA-17] - 3/16/2004 Rep Holt, Rush D. [NJ-12] -
3/11/2004 Rep Honda, Michael M. [CA-15] - 3/30/2004 Rep Hoyer, Steny H. [MD-5] - 3/16/2004 Rep Hulshof, Kenny C. [MO-9]
- 3/23/2004 Rep Israel, Steve [NY-2] - 2/24/2004 Rep Jackson, Jesse L., Jr. [IL-2] - 3/4/2004 Rep Jackson-Lee, Sheila
[TX-18] - 2/10/2004 Rep Jefferson, William J. [LA-2] - 3/25/2004 Rep John, Christopher [LA-7] - 2/11/2004 Rep Johnson,
Timothy V. [IL-15] - 3/16/2004 Rep Jones, Walter B., Jr. [NC-3] - 11/20/2003 Rep Kelly, Sue W. [NY-19] - 3/9/2004 Rep
Kennedy, Mark R. [MN-6] - 2/24/2004 Rep Kildee, Dale E. [MI-5] - 2/25/2004 Rep Kind, Ron [WI-3] - 3/16/2004 Rep King,
Peter T. [NY-3] - 3/25/2004 Rep King, Steve [IA-5] - 3/18/2004 Rep Kingston, Jack [GA-1] - 3/2/2004 Rep Kirk, Mark Steven
[IL-10] - 11/20/2003 Rep Kline, John [MN-2] - 2/11/2004 Rep Knollenberg, Joe [MI-9] - 2/24/2004 Rep LaHood, Ray [IL-18]
- 11/20/2003 Rep Lampson, Nick [TX-9] - 3/9/2004 Rep Langevin, James R. [RI-2] - 3/4/2004 Rep Larsen, Rick [WA-2] - 3/2/2004
Rep Larson, John B. [CT-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep Latham, Tom [IA-4] - 3/23/2004 Rep
LaTourette, Steve C. [OH-14] - 3/24/2004 Rep Leach, James A. [IA-2] - 2/10/2004 Rep Levin, Sander M. [MI-12] - 2/24/2004
Rep Lewis, John [GA-5] - 3/30/2004 Rep LoBiondo, Frank A. [NJ-2] - 2/11/2004 Rep Lowey, Nita M. [NY-18] - 12/8/2003 Rep
Lynch, Stephen F. [MA-9] - 4/20/2004 Rep Majette, Denise L. [GA-4] - 2/3/2004 Rep Maloney, Carolyn B. [NY-14] - 3/3/2004
Rep Matheson, Jim [UT-2] - 2/3/2004 Rep Matsui, Robert T. [CA-5] - 3/9/2004 Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] - 2/24/2004 Rep
McCollum, Betty [MN-4] - 3/9/2004 Rep McCotter, Thaddeus G. [MI-11] - 2/3/2004 Rep McCrery, Jim [LA-4] - 3/3/2004 Rep
McHugh, John M. [NY-23] - 2/24/2004 Rep McInnis, Scott [CO-3] - 2/10/2004 Rep McNulty, Michael R. [NY-21] - 1/28/2004
Rep Meehan, Martin T. [MA-5] - 3/23/2004 Rep Meek, Kendrick B. [FL-17] - 11/20/2003 Rep Menendez, Robert [NJ-13] -
3/2/2004 Rep Michaud, Michael H. [ME-2] - 1/21/2004 Rep Miller, Candice S. [MI-10] - 3/2/2004 Rep Miller, George [CA-7]
- 3/2/2004 Rep Miller, Jeff [FL-1] - 3/9/2004 Rep Moore, Dennis [KS-3] - 3/11/2004 Rep Murphy, Tim [PA-18] - 3/16/2004
Rep Musgrave, Marilyn N. [CO-4] - 2/4/2004 Rep Nadler, Jerrold [NY-8] - 3/2/2004 Rep Nethercutt, George R., Jr. [WA-5]
- 2/24/2004 Rep Northup, Anne [KY-3] - 2/26/2004 Rep Norton, Eleanor Holmes [DC] - 3/24/2004 Rep Norwood, Charlie
[GA-9] - 2/24/2004 Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] - 11/20/2003 Rep Nussle, Jim [IA-1] - 2/24/2004 Rep Olver, John W. [MA-1]
- 3/30/2004 Rep Owens, Major R. [NY-11] - 3/2/2004 Rep Pallone, Frank, Jr. [NJ-6] - 3/9/2004 Rep Pascrell, Bill, Jr.
[NJ-8] - 2/24/2004 Rep Pastor, Ed [AZ-4] - 3/30/2004 Rep Payne, Donald M. [NJ-10] - 2/26/2004 Rep Pelosi, Nancy [CA-8]
- 3/4/2004 Rep Pence, Mike [IN-6] - 2/24/2004 Rep Pitts, Joseph R. [PA-16] - 3/30/2004 Rep Platts, Todd Russell [PA-19]
- 2/24/2004 Rep Pombo, Richard W. [CA-11] - 2/4/2004 Rep Pomeroy, Earl [ND] - 3/18/2004 Rep Porter, Jon C. [NV-3] - 3/11/2004
Rep Portman, Rob [OH-2] - 3/24/2004 Rep Price, David E. [NC-4] - 3/18/2004 Rep Putnam, Adam H. [FL-12] - 2/26/2004
Rep Quinn, Jack [NY-27] - 3/25/2004 Rep Ramstad, Jim [MN-3] - 2/24/2004 Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] - 3/30/2004 Rep
Rehberg, Dennis R. [MT] - 2/25/2004 Rep Renzi, Rick [AZ-1] - 3/30/2004 Rep Reynolds, Thomas M. [NY-26] - 3/2/2004 Rep
Rodriguez, Ciro [TX-28] - 2/3/2004 Rep Rogers, Mike D. [AL-3] - 2/11/2004 Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [FL-18] - 2/10/2004
Rep Rothman, Steve R. [NJ-9] - 2/11/2004 Rep Ruppersberger, C. A. Dutch [MD-2] - 11/21/2003 Rep Rush, Bobby L. [IL-1]
- 3/25/2004 Rep Ryan, Paul [WI-1] - 3/11/2004 Rep Ryun, Jim [KS-2] - 3/23/2004 Rep Sanchez, Linda T. [CA-39] - 3/18/2004
Rep Sanchez, Loretta [CA-47] - 4/28/2004 Rep Sandlin, Max [TX-1] - 3/23/2004 Rep Saxton, Jim [NJ-3] - 2/3/2004 Rep
Schakowsky, Janice D. [IL-9] - 2/24/2004 Rep Schiff, Adam B. [CA-29] - 3/17/2004 Rep Schrock, Edward L. [VA-2] - 2/11/2004
Rep Scott, David [GA-13] - 2/3/2004 Rep Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. [WI-5] - 3/24/2004 Rep Sessions, Pete [TX-32]
- 3/3/2004 Rep Shadegg, John B. [AZ-3] - 2/4/2004 Rep Shaw, E. Clay, Jr. [FL-22] - 11/20/2003 Rep
Shays, Christopher [CT-4] - 3/2/2004 Rep Sherwood, Don [PA-10] - 3/4/2004 Rep Shimkus, John [IL-19]
- 2/10/2004 Rep Simmons, Rob [CT-2] - 3/16/2004 Rep Skelton, Ike [MO-4] -
4/22/2004 Rep Slaughter, Louise McIntosh [NY-28] - 3/25/2004 Rep Smith, Adam [WA-9] - 3/30/2004 Rep Smith, Lamar [TX-21]
- 3/23/2004 Rep Souder, Mark E. [IN-3] - 11/20/2003 Rep Stearns, Cliff [FL-6] - 3/2/2004 Rep Stupak, Bart [MI-1] - 4/28/2004
Rep Sullivan, John [OK-1] - 2/10/2004 Rep Sweeney, John E. [NY-20] - 2/10/2004 Rep Terry, Lee [NE-2] - 3/11/2004 Rep
Tiberi, Patrick J. [OH-12] - 2/24/2004 Rep Toomey, Patrick J. [PA-15] - 3/16/2004 Rep Turner, Jim [TX-2] - 2/24/2004 Rep
Udall, Mark [CO-2] - 3/11/2004 Rep Udall, Tom [NM-3] - 3/16/2004 Rep Upton, Fred [MI-6] - 3/2/2004 Rep Van Hollen, Chris
[MD-8] - 3/18/2004 Rep Vitter, David [LA-1] - 2/10/2004 Rep Waxman, Henry A. [CA-30] - 2/10/2004 Rep Weiner, Anthony
D. [NY-9] - 1/20/2004 Rep Weldon, Dave [FL-15] - 3/16/2004 Rep Weller, Jerry [IL-11] - 2/24/2004 Rep Wexler, Robert [FL-19]
- 1/20/2004 Rep Wilson, Joe [SC-2] - 11/20/2003 Rep Wu, David [OR-1] - 2/26/2004 Rep Wynn, Albert Russell [MD-4] -
3/9/2004 Rep Young, Don [AK] - 4/2/2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY AS
OF: 11/20/2003--Introduced.
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material,
facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under the
safeguards convention it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty).
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention
to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium
conversion experiments.
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution,
with particular attention to spent fuel.
Calls on the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Treaty.
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or
the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to
meet its obligations to the IAEA.
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment
and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine
nuclear weapons program.
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor:
Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest
Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
11/20/2003: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor:
Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest
Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE(S): Committee/Subcommittee:
Activity: House International Relations Referral, In Committee H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing
the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed
to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors
(230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to
the House Committee on International Relations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELATED BILL DETAILS: (additional related bills may be identified in Status) Bill: Relationship:
S.CON.RES.81 Identical bill identified by CRS
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor:
Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced 11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest
Major Action: 11/20/2003 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
H.CON.RES.332 Title: Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by
Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] (introduced
11/20/2003) Cosponsors (230) Related Bills: S.CON.RES.81 Latest Major Action: 11/20/2003
Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY
AS OF: 11/20/2003--Introduced.
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material,
facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under the
safeguards convention it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty).
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention
to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium
conversion experiments.
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution,
with particular attention to spent fuel.
Calls on the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Treaty.
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or
the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to
meet its obligations to the IAEA.
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment
and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine
nuclear weapons program. Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic... (Introduced in House) HCON 332 IH 108th CONGRESS 1st Session H. CON. RES. 332 Expressing the
deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed
to develop nuclear weapons. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES November 20, 2003 Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania (for himself,
Ms. HARMAN, Mr. KIRK, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. CARDOZA, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. MEEK of Florida, Mr. NUNES, Mr.
LAHOOD, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. CASE, Mr. DEUTSCH, and Mr. SHAW) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which
was referred to the Committee on International Relations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. Whereas,
on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'); Whereas by becoming a party
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, Iran has committed itself to permanently abstaining
from the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons; Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of nuclear weapons;
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of highly enriched
uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons; Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA
at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade
uranium at these facilities; Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over
the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including
those that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the
safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Whereas the Board of Governors
of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003, that called on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all
imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental
sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that
country, to provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other
information and explanations and take such other steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all
outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities; Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government
of Iran reached an agreement with 3 European foreign ministers in which it promised to extend full cooperation to the IAEA,
sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures, comport itself in accordance with the provisions of
the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities;
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to a variety of modern technologies
and supplies once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved; Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its
commitment to the European foreign ministers to suspend enriching and processing uranium, Iran has explicitly indicated that
it reserves the right to resume this activity at a time of its choosing; Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA
with what it claims is a full statement about the nature of its nuclear activities, the IAEA has indicated it may take some
months to fully evaluate the Iranian declaration, and IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has already stated that the documents
show that Iran failed to comply with some of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Whereas Iran
has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted access to conduct inspections that the IAEA believes are necessary to resolve issues
concerning Iran's nuclear program; Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran provided the IAEA with a declaration
that it described as a complete and accurate history of its nuclear program; Whereas Iran's National Security Council
Chief, Hassan Rouhani, stated on October 21, 2003, that Iran was not prepared to abandon its uranium enrichment program, and
the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on October 26, 2003, that it has not yet suspended uranium enrichment but was merely
studying the issue; Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and
Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile; and Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, will continue to constitute a severe threat to
international peace and security and to vital American national interests: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House
of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress-- (1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program
and the failure of the Government of Iran for well over a decade to report material, facilities, and activities to the International
Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March
5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'); (2) concurs with the view
of the Department of State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S- Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 17, 2003,
by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance that the explanations provided by the Government of Iran
for its nuclear activities are not credible; (3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual
Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing
a program to develop nuclear weapons; (4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the Government of Iran and the foreign
ministers of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, but questions whether it signifies a sincere and lasting decision by
the Government of Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program; (5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with
its obligations; (6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
including-- (A) urging the Government of Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and comply fully and unconditionally with
the terms of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003
(hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `IAEA resolution'), that calls on Iran to-- (i) provide the Agency a full
declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program; (ii) grant unrestricted
access, including environmental sampling, to the Agency; (iii) resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the Agency
experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country; (iv) provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium
conversion experiments; and (v) provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the Agency
determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear
activities; and (B) taking such diplomatic measures as are necessary to encourage other nations, especially Russia, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, to urge the Government of Iran to fully and immediately comply with the such resolution; (7)
calls on Russia to-- (A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to accept in full the IAEA resolution; (B) suspend all
nuclear cooperation with Iran, particularly the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the delivery of fuel for that
reactor, until Iran fully and completely complies with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional Protocol; (C)
insist that no fuel will be supplied to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent fuel to Russia; and (D)
put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran cannot divert any spent fuel; (8) calls on member states of the United Nations
to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear
weapons program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies
fully with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional Protocol; (9) calls on the European Union to condition
economic and commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by Iran with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons
and to stipulate that any rights that Iran obtains under such agreements will be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with
the work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to acquire nuclear weapons; (10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its
own regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003, board
meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for further action; (11) calls on the United Nations
Security Council, immediately upon receiving any violations report from the IAEA, to address the threat to international peace
and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a Security Council resolution, or take such other action that
may be necessary to impose stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran; and (12) calls on the Government of
Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment and processing of uranium until
it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program by-- (A)
coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt and unconditional
implementation of the Model Additional Protocol; and (B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the
means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)
Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution
agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means
to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003)
Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution
agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S): (italics indicate
a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: A concurrent resolution expressing the deep concern
of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop
nuclear weapons.
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE: A concurrent resolution expressing the
concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS: (color
indicates Senate actions) 11/13/2003: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of
measure as introduced: CR 11/14/2003 S14818-14819) 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous
Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8795-8798) 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3569
Amendment SA 3569 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8796-8797; text: CR S8796-8797) To provide
a complete substitute. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration:
CR S8797-8798; text: CR S8797-8798) To amend the preamble. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 proposed by
Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798) To amend the title. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3569
Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Resolution
agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE(S): Committee/Subcommittee:
Activity: Senate Foreign Relations Referral, Discharged
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELATED BILL
DETAILS: (additional related bills may be indentified in Status) Bill: Relationship: H.CON.RES.332 Identical
bill identified by CRS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AMENDMENT(S):
1. S.AMDT.3569 to S.CON.RES.81 To provide a complete substitute. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ]
(introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (3) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed
to. Status: Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 2. S.AMDT.3570 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend
the preamble. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors
(None) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous
Consent.
3. S.AMDT.3571 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced
7/22/2004) Cosponsors (None) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to.
Status: Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(69),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Allen,
George [VA] - 1/22/2004 Sen Baucus, Max [MT] - 6/1/2004 Sen Bayh, Evan [IN] - 3/22/2004 Sen Bingaman, Jeff [NM] - 6/8/2004
Sen Bond, Christopher S. [MO] - 3/2/2004 Sen Breaux, John B. [LA] - 3/9/2004 Sen Brownback, Sam [KS] - 11/14/2003
Sen Bunning, Jim [KY] - 2/10/2004 Sen Cantwell, Maria [WA] - 3/22/2004 Sen Carper, Thomas R. [DE] - 3/10/2004 Sen
Chambliss, Saxby [GA] - 4/19/2004 Sen Clinton, Hillary Rodham [NY] - 3/4/2004 Sen Cochran, Thad [MS] - 11/13/2003 Sen
Coleman, Norm [MN] - 11/13/2003 Sen Collins, Susan M. [ME] - 2/23/2004 Sen Cornyn, John [TX] - 3/1/2004 Sen Corzine,
Jon [NJ] - 11/19/2003 Sen Crapo, Michael D. [ID] - 11/18/2003 Sen Daschle, Thomas A. [SD] - 4/1/2004 Sen Dayton, Mark
[MN] - 5/20/2004 Sen DeWine, Michael [OH] - 5/13/2004 Sen Dodd, Christopher J. [CT] - 2/24/2004
Sen Dole, Elizabeth H. [NC] - 3/1/2004 Sen Dorgan, Byron L. [ND] - 2/23/2004 Sen Durbin, Richard J. [IL] - 3/23/2004
Sen Ensign, John E. [NV] - 3/22/2004 Sen Feingold, Russell D. [WI] - 3/9/2004 Sen Fitzgerald, Peter [IL] - 11/13/2003
Sen Graham, Bob [FL] - 3/22/2004 Sen Grassley, Charles E. [IA] - 2/23/2004 Sen Gregg, Judd [NH] - 3/4/2004 Sen Hutchison,
Kay Bailey [TX] - 5/17/2004 Sen Inhofe, Jim [OK] - 2/26/2004 Sen Inouye, Daniel K. [HI] - 4/20/2004 Sen Johnson, Tim
[SD] - 2/11/2004 Sen Kerry, John F. [MA] - 4/20/2004 Sen Kohl, Herb [WI] - 5/18/2004 Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] - 11/13/2003 Sen
Landrieu, Mary [LA] - 2/24/2004 Sen Lautenberg, Frank R. [NJ] - 11/13/2003 Sen Levin, Carl [MI] - 3/1/2004 Sen Lieberman, Joseph I. [CT] - 11/13/2003 Sen Lincoln, Blanche [AR] - 3/23/2004 Sen Lott,
Trent [MS] - 2/25/2004 Sen McCain, John [AZ] - 4/19/2004 Sen McConnell, Mitch [KY] - 11/18/2003 Sen Mikulski, Barbara
A. [MD] - 11/19/2003 Sen Miller, Zell [GA] - 11/20/2003 Sen Murkowski, Lisa [AK] - 12/9/2003 Sen Murray, Patty [WA] -
2/12/2004 Sen Nelson, Bill [FL] - 3/24/2004 Sen Nelson, E. Benjamin [NE] - 3/24/2004 Sen Nickles, Don [OK] - 2/26/2004
Sen Reid, Harry M. [NV] - 1/22/2004 Sen Roberts, Pat [KS] - 5/17/2004 Sen Santorum, Rick [PA] - 11/13/2003 Sen Schumer,
Charles E. [NY] - 3/4/2004 Sen Sessions, Jeff [AL] - 3/30/2004 Sen Shelby, Richard C. [AL] - 2/24/2004 Sen Smith, Gordon
[OR] - 2/25/2004 Sen Snowe, Olympia J. [ME] - 4/19/2004 Sen Specter, Arlen [PA] - 4/19/2004 Sen Stabenow, Debbie [MI]
- 2/25/2004 Sen Stevens, Ted [AK] - 5/20/2004 Sen Sununu, John E. [NH] - 3/23/2004 Sen Talent, Jim [MO] - 2/24/2004 Sen
Thomas, Craig [WY] - 3/22/2004 Sen Voinovich, George V. [OH] - 11/21/2003 Sen Wyden, Ron [OR] - 3/4/2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY AS
OF: 11/13/2003--Introduced.
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material,
facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention
to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium
conversion experiments.
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution,
with particular attention to spent fuel.
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or
the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to
meet its obligations to the IAEA.
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment
and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine
nuclear weapons program.
S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of
Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced
11/13/2003) Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004
Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an
amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S):
(italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: A concurrent resolution expressing the
deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed
to develop nuclear weapons.
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE: A concurrent resolution expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of
Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced
11/13/2003) Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004
Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an
amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS:
(color indicates Senate actions) 11/13/2003: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of measure as introduced:
CR 11/14/2003 S14818-14819) 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure
laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8795-8798) 7/22/2004: Resolution agreed to in Senate with
an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of
Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced
11/13/2003) Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004
Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an
amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS:
(color indicates Senate actions) 11/13/2003: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of measure as introduced:
CR 11/14/2003 S14818-14819) 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure
laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8795-8798) 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3569 Amendment SA 3569 proposed
by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8796-8797; text: CR S8796-8797) To provide a complete substitute.
7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8797-8798;
text: CR S8797-8798) To amend the preamble. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 proposed by Senator Frist
for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798) To amend the title. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3569 Amendment
SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3570 Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous
Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3571 Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Resolution
agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. S.CON.RES.81
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear
weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced 11/13/2003) Cosponsors (69) Related
Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate
with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE(S): Committee/Subcommittee:
Activity: Senate Foreign Relations Referral, Discharged S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne
[CA] (introduced 11/13/2003) Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major
Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to
the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY AS OF: 11/13/2003--Introduced.
Deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report material,
facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Concurs with the conclusion of the Department of State that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons.
Calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with particular attention
to the needs of the IAEA for information and access, including information concerning gas centrifuges and the conduct of uranium
conversion experiments.
Calls on Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran fully complies with a specified IAEA resolution,
with particular attention to spent fuel.
Calls on the United Nations Security Council to consider immediately the passage of a Security Council resolution or
the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to
meet its obligations to the IAEA.
Calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment
and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine
nuclear weapons program. There are 2 versions of Bill Number S.CON.RES.81 for the 108th Congress 1 . Expressing the deep
concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic... (Introduced in Senate)[S.CON.RES.81.IS]
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations
under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic... (Introduced in Senate)
SCON 81 IS
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. CON. RES. 81 Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the
failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 13 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 12), 2003 Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. KYL, Mr. LIEBERMAN,
Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. FITZGERALD, and Mr. COCHRAN) submitted the following concurrent resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding
the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.
Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington,
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, Iran has committed
itself to permanently abstaining from the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing
a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of nuclear weapons;
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of highly enriched
uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;
Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric Company
could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;
Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government
of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential
to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed
in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003, that called on Iran to provide
the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to grant unrestricted
access, including environmental sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who
tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments,
and to provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve
by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran reached an agreement with 3 European foreign ministers in which it
promised to extend full cooperation to the IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures, comport
itself in accordance with the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and voluntarily suspend all
uranium enrichment and processing activities;
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to a variety of modern technologies
and supplies once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the European foreign ministers to suspend enriching and processing
uranium, Iran has explicitly indicated that it reserves the right to resume this activity at a time of its choosing;
Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it claims is a full statement about the nature of its nuclear
activities, the IAEA has indicated it may take some months to fully evaluate the Iranian declaration, and IAEA head Mohammed
El Baradei has already stated that the documents show that Iran failed to comply with some of its commitments under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted access to conduct inspections that the IAEA believes are necessary
to resolve issues concerning Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran provided the IAEA with a declaration that it described as a complete
and accurate history of its nuclear program;
Whereas Iran's National Security Council Chief, Hassan Rouhani, stated on October 21, 2003, that Iran was not prepared
to abandon its uranium enrichment program, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on October 26, 2003, that it has not
yet suspended uranium enrichment but was merely studying the issue;
Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking
to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile; and
Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist
groups, will continue to constitute a severe threat to international peace and security and to vital American national interests:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress--
(1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons program and the failure of the Government of Iran for well
over a decade to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of
its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution
referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
(2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S- Israel Joint Parliamentary
Committee on September 17, 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance that the explanations
provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear activities are not credible;
(3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
(4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the Government of Iran and the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom, but questions whether it signifies a sincere and lasting decision by the Government of Iran to abandon
its nuclear weapons program;
(5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with its obligations;
(6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
(A) urging the Government of Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and comply fully and unconditionally with the terms
of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter
in this resolution referred to as the `IAEA resolution'), that calls on Iran to--
(i) provide the Agency a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment
program;
(ii) grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the Agency;
(iii) resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the Agency experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country;
(iv) provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments; and
(v) provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the Agency determines necessary to resolve
by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities; and
(B) taking such diplomatic measures as are necessary to encourage other nations, especially Russia, France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, to urge the Government of Iran to fully and immediately comply with the such resolution;
(7) calls on Russia to--
(A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to accept in full the IAEA resolution;
(B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran, particularly the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the delivery
of fuel for that reactor, until Iran fully and completely complies with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model
Additional Protocol;
(C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent fuel to Russia;
and
(D) put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran cannot divert any spent fuel;
(8) calls on member states of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop
programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including
the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional
Protocol;
(9) calls on the European Union to condition economic and commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by Iran
with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and to stipulate that any rights that Iran obtains under such agreements
will be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with the work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to acquire nuclear weapons;
(10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its own regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003, board meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council
for further action;
(11) calls on the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any violations report from the IAEA, to
address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a Security Council
resolution, or take such other action that may be necessary to impose stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions against
Iran; and
(12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the enrichment
and processing of uranium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine
nuclear weapons program by--
(A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt
and unconditional implementation of the Model Additional Protocol; and
(B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 2 . Whereas it is the policy of the
United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods
or technology, including... (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)[S.CON.RES.81.ES]
Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also
to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including... (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)
SCON 81 ES
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. CON. RES. 81
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement
of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology,
wherever that transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that `all States
shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery';
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous times on persons and entities transferring equipment and technical
data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass destruction programs;
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty");
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after
the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for
a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched
uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation
of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the
facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a uranium
metal processing facility, despite the fact that neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require
uranium metal for fuel;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate
fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed
to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions
about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, including those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched
uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion
experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that should have
been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and
any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to sign,
ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards (the `Additional
Protocol') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate
closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint
statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined
by the IAEA;
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access
to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges
at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms
of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly
more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran `had
been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 percent';
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information
that should have been provided, including the fact that `some samples from' the laser uranium enrichment project `had been
sent for assessment to the supplier's laboratory';
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets
and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its
Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act
in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment
and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related
items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted
Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has
concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its
nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge
technology imported from foreign sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported explanations about experiments to create
a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from
one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed more than
trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge
components, and that the types of uranium contamination at that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which would
appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge components and
perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, report, that `the contamination is different on domestic and
imported centrifuges,' that `it is unlikely' that the 36 percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired from Iran's
principal supplier country, and that `important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently required repeated
requests, and in some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory information';
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances
to the IAEA and the international community of full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium
enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to manufacture and, until
April 2004, to import, uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment
activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of
Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges,
and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President
of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full
transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and
to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives; Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment
and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question
of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear
fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented, would undercut the international effort to persuade Iran
to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past
and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution,' and also noted that the IAEA
has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development
of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the
sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced
centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to
support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest
against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors
to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries
Organization, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA
concluded would constitute production of feed material for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 2004, that
its suspension of all uranium enrichment activities `does not include suspension of production of UF6,' which contradicted
assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 2004, which was also adopted unanimously, `deplores' the
fact that `Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been' and `underlines that, with
the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding
of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant
places, data and persons';
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran's suspension `commitments have not been comprehensively implemented
and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings';
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its
decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of a research
reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international
confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the IAEA
Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, which called on Iran `to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related
activities,' and Iran's voluntary suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to its agreement of October 21,
2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium,
its use of sources who provided a nuclear weapon design to another country, its production of centrifuge components at Defence
Industries Organization workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also
violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in
acquiring nuclear weapons; and
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing
facilities will continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and threaten United States national
interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress--
(1) condemns--
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
(B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA and the international community about its nuclear programs
and activities;
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary
to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty'), including the United States, to use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including
the suspension of all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully
implements the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to as
the `Additional Protocol') and is clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA,
has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion
and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research
activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, together
with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence
of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement
and the Additional Protocol;
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle
its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities, which
has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program and has
led to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the establishment
of cooperative programs between the United States and Libya;
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and
long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its support for international terrorist organizations;
(9) notes the assistance that the United States has provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on December
26, 2003;
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities,
in particular all uranium enrichment activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing of related equipment;
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international commitments and to rescind its decisions--
(A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
(B) to produce feed material that could be used in those centrifuges; and
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could be used for plutonium production;
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and legal obligations--
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted access;
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities; and
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European
Union and the United States pledged to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies actions
states should take--
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
(B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at
the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(14) urges close cooperation between the United States and the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in
their June 26, 2004, declaration of `the IAEA Board of Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's insufficient cooperation
and call on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its nuclear
programme and suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities';
(15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not to implement
such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including
a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(16) further calls upon the members of the European Union to undertake such additional measures, including imposing sanctions
and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may be
necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations and commitments
to the IAEA;
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns
of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement
for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or
suspend all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop
programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including
the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon
Russia--
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor
that would enter into force before Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including
a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian
nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, sites, and information related to the investigations;
(C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
(D) to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further
assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
(A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the
IAEA; and
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA
or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance is uncertain;
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the `proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace
and security,' to consider measures necessary--
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities;
(22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding
the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, to address the threat to international peace and security posed
by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 41 of
the Charter of the United Nations;
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant
violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended
to support a military nuclear program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in
nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
including the United States, to seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
in Geneva, Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in
those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states
assured and affordable access to--
(A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in peaceful nuclear activities; and
(B) spent fuel management; and
(25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Passed
the Senate July 22, 2004.
Attest:
Secretary.
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. CON. RES. 81
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Amendments For S.CON.RES.81 1. S.AMDT.3569 to S.CON.RES.81 To provide a complete substitute. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon
[AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (3) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment
agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3569 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
S.AMDT.3569 Amends: S.CON.RES.81 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(3),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE]
- 7/22/2004 Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. S.AMDT.3570 to S.CON.RES.81
To amend the preamble. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3570 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous
Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. S.AMDT.3571 to S.CON.RES.81 To amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (None) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3571 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent.
S.CON.RES.81 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern
of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] (introduced
11/13/2003) Cosponsors (69) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.332 Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004
Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an
amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELATED
BILL DETAILS: (additional related bills may be identified in Status) Bill: Relationship: H.CON.RES.332 Identical
bill identified by CRS
H.CON.RES.398
This was (H.Con.Res.398), a concurrent resolution passed after Congress passed Resolution 332. These resolutions
stated clearly a deep concern by the Congress that a sovereign nation which disclosed under international law as
well as legal for a sovereign nation to possess these weapons for defensive means has taken umbrage over Iran's development
to acquire the means to produce nuclear weapons. The United States has the most nuclear weapons and never has relented
in trying not to procure less of those deadly weapons but happens to increase how it conducts the arms race even after the
fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEW
SEARCH | HOME | HELP | ABOUT TITLE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear
weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Cosponsors (51) Latest
Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment
to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S):
(italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce
nuclear weapons.
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress
over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)
(51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment
and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means
to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51) Latest Major Action:
7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title
and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
Amendments For H.CON.RES.398 1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (3) Latest Major Action:
7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2.
S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent. Amendments For H.CON.RES.398 1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and
amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (3) Latest
Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- S.AMDT.3572
Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
S.AMDT.3573 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(1),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(3), ALPHABETICAL [followed
by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004 Sen Feinstein,
Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
S.AMDT.3572 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE: To provide a complete substitute and amend the title.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8782-8783
STATUS:
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) 7/22/2004: Amendment
SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(3):
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004 Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] -
7/22/2004
S.AMDT.3574 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(1),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
2. S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent.
S.AMDT.3573 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) AMENDMENT
PURPOSE: To amend the preamble.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8783-8785
STATUS:
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) 7/22/2004: Amendment
SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(1):
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent. S.AMDT.3574 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004)
(proposed 7/22/2004) AMENDMENT PURPOSE: To amend the title.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8785
STATUS:
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798)
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(1):
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress H.CON.RES.398 Title: A
concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed
to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble
by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(51), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort:
by date)Ackerman, Gary L. [NY-5] - 3/25/2004 Rep Baird, Brian [WA-3] - 5/6/2004 Rep Bereuter, Doug [NE-1] -
5/4/2004 Rep Berkley, Shelley [NV-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Berman, Howard L. [CA-28] - 3/25/2004 Rep Biggert,
Judy [IL-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Blackburn, Marsha [TN-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep Blunt, Roy [MO-7] - 3/25/2004 Rep
Boozman, John [AR-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Burton, Dan [IN-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Carson, Brad [OK-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Carter, John R. [TX-31] - 5/4/2004 Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] - 3/25/2004 Rep Chandler, Ben [KY-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr. [AL-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Engel, Eliot L. [NY-17] - 5/4/2004 Rep Etheridge, Bob [NC-2]
- 5/4/2004 Rep Feeney, Tom [FL-24] - 5/4/2004 Rep Frank, Barney [MA-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36]
- 5/4/2004 Rep Harris, Katherine [FL-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoeffel, Joseph M. [PA-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hooley,
Darlene [OR-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoyer, Steny H. [MD-5] - 5/5/2004 Rep Kelly, Sue W. [NY-19] - 5/4/2004 Rep
King, Peter T. [NY-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Lampson, Nick [TX-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Lantos, Tom [CA-12] - 3/25/2004 Rep
Markey, Edward J. [MA-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] - 5/5/2004 Rep McCotter, Thaddeus G. [MI-11]
- 5/4/2004 Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] - 5/4/2004 Rep Pence, Mike [IN-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Pickering, Charles
W. (Chip) [MS-3] - 5/5/2004 Rep Pitts, Joseph R. [PA-16] - 5/4/2004 Rep Porter, Jon C. [NV-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Price, David E. [NC-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Ramstad, Jim [MN-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Renzi, Rick [AZ-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [FL-18] - 3/25/2004 Rep Schiff, Adam B. [CA-29] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sherman, Brad [CA-27] -
3/25/2004 Rep Smith, Christopher H. [NJ-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Souder, Mark E. [IN-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Strickland,
Ted [OH-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sullivan, John [OK-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Tauscher, Ellen O. [CA-10] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Terry, Lee [NE-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Weller, Jerry [IL-11] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Wexler, Robert [FL-19] - 5/4/2004 H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over
Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)
Cosponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with
an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S): (italics indicate
a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce
nuclear weapons.
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions)
3/25/2004: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. 3/31/2004: Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration
Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote. 5/5/2004 6:28pm: Mr. Burton (IN) moved to suspend the rules and agree
to the resolution. 5/5/2004 6:29pm: Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2617-2623) 5/5/2004
7:05pm: At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause
8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed. 5/6/2004 3:15pm: Considered
as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the
resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
5/6/2004 3:20pm: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection. 5/6/2004: Received in the
Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged
by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799) 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3572
Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) To provide a complete substitute
and amend the title. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration:
CR S8798) To amend the preamble. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator
Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798) To amend the title. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3572 Amendment SA 3572 agreed
to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent.
7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Resolution agreed
to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEW
SEARCH | HOME | HELP | ABOUT STATUS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear
weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Cosponsors (51) Latest
Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment
to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS:
(color indicates Senate actions) 3/25/2004: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. 3/31/2004: Committee
Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote. 5/5/2004 6:28pm: Mr. Burton (IN) moved to
suspend the rules and agree to the resolution. 5/5/2004 6:29pm: Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration:
CR H2617-2623) 5/5/2004 7:05pm: At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant
to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed. 5/6/2004
3:15pm: Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: On motion to suspend the rules
and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR
5/5/2004 H2617-2619) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection. 5/6/2004: Received
in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
discharged by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by
Unanimous Consent. H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)
Cosponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with
an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY
AS OF: 5/6/2004--Passed House, without amendment. (There is 1 other summary)
(This measure has not been amended since it was introduced. The summary of that version is repeated here.)
States that Congress: (1) condemns Iran's continuing deceptions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
the international community about its nuclear programs and activities, and demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease
efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and cease nuclear enrichment activities; (2) calls upon all State Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means
to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, until Iran fully
implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards; (3) calls upon all countries
to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related
activities that support Iran's energy industry; (4) urges the IAEA Board of Governors to report to the United Nations Security
Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements; (5) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Zangger Committee, and other international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under NPT who commit
violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities
which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities; (6)
urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures to support IAEA inspection efforts; and (7) urges the President
to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. There are 4 versions
of Bill Number H.CON.RES.398 for the 108th Congress 1 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the
means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)[H.CON.RES.398.IH]
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)
HCON 398 IH
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398 Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 25, 2004 Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN,
and Mr. CHABOT) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear
weapons.
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities
in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed
to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after
the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear
weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched
uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation
of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use
and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate
fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation,
Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve
questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and
any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign,
ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen
investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with
the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted
research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre,
despite its earlier denials of such activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint
statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined
by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied
international concerns about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges
at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of
uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed
them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for
further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment
and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related
items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted
Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has
concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding
its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment
centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly
toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons
development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances
to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium
enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture
uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever
it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of
Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges,
and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's
Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency
and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and
to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black
market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused
to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude
an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction
Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past
and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency
has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development
of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the
sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced
centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to
support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest
against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors
by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium,
and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under
article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending
all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional
Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited
the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable
research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement
by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing
policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to
immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing
related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted
access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about
all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program
and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand
and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent
cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to
persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States,
and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement
for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or
cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign
commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls
upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor,
until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian
nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance,
to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately
review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries
seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council
that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are
necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage
in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear
fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts
by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
2 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to
Senate Committee after being Received from House)[H.CON.RES.398.RFS]
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate
Committee after being Received from House)
HCON 398 RFS
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 6, 2004 Received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear
weapons.
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities
in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed
to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after
the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear
weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched
uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation
of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use
and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate
fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation,
Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve
questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and
any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign,
ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen
investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with
the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted
research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre,
despite its earlier denials of such activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint
statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined
by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied
international concerns about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges
at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of
uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed
them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for
further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment
and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related
items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted
Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has
concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding
its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment
centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly
toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons
development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances
to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium
enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture
uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever
it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of
Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges,
and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's
Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency
and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and
to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black
market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused
to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude
an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction
Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past
and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency
has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development
of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the
sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced
centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to
support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest
against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors
by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium,
and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under
article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending
all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional
Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited
the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable
research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement
by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing
policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to
immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing
related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted
access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about
all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program
and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand
and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent
cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to
persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States,
and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement
for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or
cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign
commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls
upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor,
until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian
nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance,
to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately
review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries
seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council
that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are
necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage
in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear
fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts
by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Passed
the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
Attest:
JEFF TRANDAHL,
Clerk.
3 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as
Agreed to or Passed by House)[H.CON.RES.398.EH]
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as
Agreed to or Passed by House)
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
HCON 398 EH
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to
Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed
to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after
the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear
weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched
uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation
of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use
and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate
fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation,
Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve
questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and
any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign,
ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen
investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with
the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted
research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre,
despite its earlier denials of such activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint
statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined
by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied
international concerns about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges
at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of
uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed
them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for
further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment
and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related
items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted
Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has
concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding
its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment
centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly
toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons
development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances
to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium
enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture
uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever
it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of
Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges,
and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's
Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency
and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and
to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black
market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused
to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude
an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction
Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past
and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency
has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development
of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the
sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced
centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to
support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest
against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors
by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium,
and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under
article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending
all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional
Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited
the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable
research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement
by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing
policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to
immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing
related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted
access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about
all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program
and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand
and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent
cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to
persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States,
and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement
for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or
cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign
commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls
upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor,
until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian
nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance,
to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately
review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries
seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council
that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are
necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage
in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear
fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts
by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Passed
the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
Attest:
Clerk 4 . Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent
resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)[H.CON.RES.398.EAS]
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)
HCON 398 EAS
In the Senate of the United States,
July 22, 2004. Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent
resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.', do pass with
the following
AMENDMENTS:
( 1 ) Page 1, strike out the preamble and insert: Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and
urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, including
dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that `all States
shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery';
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous times on persons and entities transferring equipment and technical
data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass destruction programs;
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after
the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for
a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched
uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation
of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the
facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a uranium
metal processing facility, despite the fact that neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require
uranium metal for fuel;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate
fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed
to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions
about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, including those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched
uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion
experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that should have
been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and
any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to sign,
ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards (the `Additional
Protocol') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate
closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint
statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined
by the IAEA;
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access
to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges
at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms
of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly
more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran `had
been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 percent';
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information
that should have been provided, including the fact that `some samples from' the laser uranium enrichment project `had been
sent for assessment to the supplier's laboratory';
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets
and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its
Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act
in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment
and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related
items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted
Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has
concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its
nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge
technology imported from foreign sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported explanations about experiments to create
a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from
one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed more than
trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge
components, and that the types of uranium contamination at that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which would
appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge components and
perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, report, that `the contamination is different on domestic and
imported centrifuges,' that `it is unlikely' that the 36 percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired from Iran's
principal supplier country, and that `important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently required repeated
requests, and in some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory information';
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances
to the IAEA and the international community of full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium
enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to manufacture and, until
April 2004, to import, uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment
activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of
Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges,
and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President
of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full
transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and
to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives; Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment
and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question
of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear
fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented, would undercut the international effort to persuade Iran
to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past
and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution,' and also noted that the IAEA
has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development
of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the
sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced
centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to
support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest
against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors
to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries
Organization, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA
concluded would constitute production of feed material for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 2004, that
its suspension of all uranium enrichment activities `does not include suspension of production of UF6,' which contradicted
assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 2004, which was also adopted unanimously, `deplores' the
fact that `Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been' and `underlines that, with
the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding
of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant
places, data and persons';
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran's suspension `commitments have not been comprehensively implemented
and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings';
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its
decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of a research
reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international
confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the IAEA
Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, which called on Iran `to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related
activities,' and Iran's voluntary suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to its agreement of October 21,
2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium,
its use of sources who provided a nuclear weapon design to another country, its production of centrifuge components at Defence
Industries Organization workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also
violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in
acquiring nuclear weapons; and
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing
facilities will continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and threaten United States national
interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
( 2 ) Page 8, line 2, strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:
That Congress--
(1) condemns--
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
(B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA and the international community about its nuclear programs
and activities;
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary
to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty'), including the United States, to use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including
the suspension of all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully
implements the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to as
the `Additional Protocol') and is clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA,
has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion
and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research
activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, together
with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence
of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement
and the Additional Protocol;
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle
its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities, which
has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program and has
led to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the establishment
of cooperative programs between the United States and Libya;
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and
long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its support for international terrorist organizations;
(9) notes the assistance that the United States has provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on December
26, 2003;
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities,
in particular all uranium enrichment activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing of related equipment;
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international commitments and to rescind its decisions--
(A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
(B) to produce feed material that could be used in those centrifuges; and
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could be used for plutonium production;
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and legal obligations--
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted access;
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities; and
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European
Union and the United States pledged to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies actions
states should take--
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
(B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at
the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(14) urges close cooperation between the United States and the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in
their June 26, 2004, declaration of `the IAEA Board of Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's insufficient cooperation
and call on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its nuclear
programme and suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities';
(15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not to implement
such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including
a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(16) further calls upon the members of the European Union to undertake such additional measures, including imposing sanctions
and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may be
necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations and commitments
to the IAEA;
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns
of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement
for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or
suspend all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop
programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including
the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon
Russia--
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor
that would enter into force before Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including
a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian
nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, sites, and information related to the investigations;
(C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
(D) to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further
assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
(A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the
IAEA; and
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA
or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance is uncertain;
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the `proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace
and security,' to consider measures necessary--
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities;
(22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding
the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, to address the threat to international peace and security posed
by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 41 of
the Charter of the United Nations;
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant
violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended
to support a military nuclear program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in
nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
including the United States, to seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
in Geneva, Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in
those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states
assured and affordable access to--
(A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in peaceful nuclear activities; and
(B) spent fuel management; and
(25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Amend
the title so as to read: `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to
produce nuclear weapons.'.
Attest:
Secretary.
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
AMENDMENTS H. CON. RES. 398: EXPRESSING THE CONCERN OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS -- HON. RON PAUL (Extensions of Remarks - May 17, 2004)
[Page: E877] GPO's PDF ---
HON. RON PAUL OF TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 17, 2004
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this ill-conceived and ill-timed legislation. Let's not fool ourselves:
this concurrent resolution leads us down the road to war against Iran. It creates a precedent for future escalation, as did
similar legislation endorsing ``regime change'' in Iraq back in 1998.
I find it incomprehensible that as the failure of our Iraq policy becomes more evident--even to its most determined advocates--we
here are approving the same kind of policy toward Iran. With Iraq becoming more of a problem daily, the solution as envisioned
by this legislation is to look for yet another fight. And we should not fool ourselves: this legislation sets the stage for
direct conflict with Iran. The resolution ``calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons .....'' Note the phrase ``use all appropriate means.''
Additionally, this legislation calls for yet more and stricter sanctions on Iran, including a demand that other countries
also impose sanctions on Iran. As we know, sanctions are unmistakably a move toward war, particularly when, as in this legislation,
a demand is made that the other nations of the world similarly isolate and blockade the country. Those who wish for a regime
change in Iran should especially reject sanctions--just look at how our Cuba policy has allowed Fidel Castro to maintain his
hold on power for decades. Sanctions do not hurt political leaders, as we know most recently from our sanctions against Iraq,
but rather sow misery among the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society. Dictators do not go hungry when sanctions
are imposed.
It is somewhat ironic that vie are again meddling in Iranian affairs. Students of history will recall that the U.S. government's
ill-advised coup against Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and its subsequent installation of the Shah as the supreme
ruler led to intense hatred of the United States and eventually to the radical Islamic revolution of 1979. One can only wonder
what our relations would be with Iran if not for the decades of meddling in that country's internal affairs. We likely would
not be considering resolutions such as this. Yet the solution to all the difficulties created by our meddling foreign policy
always seems to be yet more meddling. Will Congress ever learn?
I urge my colleagues to reject this move toward war with Iran, to reject the failed policies of regime-change and nation-building,
and to return to the wise and consistent policy of non-interventionism in the affairs of other sovereign nations. FINAL VOTE
RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 152 (Republicans in roman; Democrats in italic; Independents underlined)
H CON RES 398 2/3 YEA-AND-NAY 6-May-2004 3:19 PM QUESTION: On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree BILL TITLE:
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of the means to produce nuclear weapons
\l "Y" \l "N" \l "P" \l "NV" Republican 203 1 23 Democratic 172 2 14 17 Independent 1 TOTALS 376 3 14 40
---- YEAS 376 ---
Abercrombie Ackerman Aderholt Akin Alexander Allen Andrews Bachus Baird Baker Baldwin Ballance Barrett
(SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Bass Beauprez Becerra Bell Bereuter Berman Berry Biggert Bilirakis Bishop
(GA) Bishop (NY) Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blumenauer Boehlert Bonilla Bonner Boozman Boswell Boucher Bradley
(NH) Brady (PA) Brady (TX) Brown (OH) Brown (SC) Brown, Corrine Brown-Waite, Ginny Burns Burr Burton
(IN) Buyer Calvert Camp Cannon Cantor Capito Capps Cardin Cardoza Carson (IN) Carson (OK) Carter Case Castle Chabot Chandler Chocola Clay Clyburn Coble Collins Cooper Costello Cox Cramer Crane Crenshaw Crowley Cubin Culberson Cummings Cunningham Davis
(AL) Davis (CA) Davis (FL) Davis (IL) Davis (TN) Davis, Tom Deal (GA) DeFazio DeGette DeLauro DeLay Deutsch Diaz-Balart,
L. Diaz-Balart, M. Dicks Dingell Doggett Dooley (CA) Doolittle Dreier Duncan Dunn Edwards Ehlers Emanuel Emerson Engel English Eshoo Etheridge Evans Everett Fattah Ferguson Flake Foley Forbes Ford Fossella Frank
(MA) Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Frost Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gibbons Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gonzalez Goode Goodlatte Gordon Goss Graves Green
(TX) Green (WI) Grijalva Gutknecht Hall Harman Harris Hart Hastings (FL) Hayes Hayworth Hefley Hensarling Herger Hill Hinojosa Hobson Hoeffel Hoekstra Holden Holt Honda Hooley
(OR) Hostettler Houghton Hoyer Hulshof Hyde Inslee Isakson Israel Issa Istook Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee
(TX) Jefferson Johnson (CT) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Kaptur Keller Kelly Kennedy
(MN) Kennedy (RI) Kildee Kilpatrick Kind King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kleczka Kline Knollenberg Kolbe LaHood Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen
(WA) Larson (CT) LaTourette Leach Levin Lewis (CA) Lewis (GA) Linder Lipinski LoBiondo Lofgren Lowey Lucas
(KY) Lucas (OK) Lynch Majette Maloney Manzullo Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (MO) McCarthy
(NY) McCotter McGovern McInnis McIntyre McKeon Meehan Meek (FL) Menendez Mica Michaud Millender-McDonald Miller
(FL) Miller (MI) Miller (NC) Miller, Gary Moore Moran (KS) Moran (VA) Murphy Murtha Musgrave Myrick Nadler Napolitano Nethercutt Neugebauer Ney Northup Norwood Nunes Nussle Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Osborne Ose Otter Owens Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Pearce Pelosi Pence Peterson
(MN) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Pombo Pomeroy Porter Portman Price (NC) Pryce (OH) Putnam Quinn Radanovich Ramstad Rangel Regula Rehberg Renzi Reynolds Rodriguez Rogers
(AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Royce Ruppersberger Rush Ryan
(OH) Ryan (WI) Ryun (KS) Sabo Sánchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sanders Sandlin Saxton Schakowsky Schiff Schrock Scott
(GA) Scott (VA) Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shaw Shays Sherman Sherwood Shimkus Shuster Simmons Simpson Skelton Slaughter Smith
(MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Smith (WA) Snyder Souder Stearns Stenholm Strickland Stupak Sullivan Sweeney Tancredo Tanner Tauscher Taylor
(MS) Taylor (NC) Terry Thomas Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Tierney Toomey Towns Turner
(OH) Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Upton Van Hollen Velázquez Visclosky Vitter Walden (OR) Walsh Wamp Watt Waxman Weiner Weldon
(FL) Weldon (PA) Weller Wexler Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wolf Wu Wynn Young (AK)
---- NAYS 3 --- Conyers Kucinich Paul
---- ANSWERED "PRESENT" 14 --- Capuano Filner Hinchey Kanjorski Lee McDermott Miller, George Mollohan Rahall Serrano Stark Waters Watson Woolsey
---- NOT VOTING 40 --- Baca Ballenger Berkley Blunt Boehner Bono Boyd Burgess Cole Davis,
Jo Ann Delahunt DeMint Doyle Farr Feeney Gephardt Granger Greenwood Gutierrez Hastings
(WA) Hunter Jenkins John Latham Lewis (KY) McCollum McCrery McHugh McNulty Meeks (NY) Neal
(MA) Oxley Peterson (PA) Reyes Solis Spratt Tauzin Turner (TX) Wilson (SC) Young (FL)
Bill Summary & Status for the 108th
Congress -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEW SEARCH
| HOME | HELP | ABOUT TITLE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.CON.RES.398
Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear
weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Cosponsors (51)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and
an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S):
(italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: Expressing the concern
of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE: A concurrent resolution
expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. H.CON.RES.398 Title:
A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate.
Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous
Consent.
H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced
3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in
Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
Amendments For H.CON.RES.398 1. S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398
To provide a complete substitute and amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (3) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2.
S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the preamble. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004)
Cosponsors (1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To amend the title. Sponsor:
Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate
amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. Amendments For H.CON.RES.398 1.
S.AMDT.3572 to H.CON.RES.398 To provide a complete substitute and amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced
7/22/2004) Cosponsors (3) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status:
Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- S.AMDT.3572
Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004)
S.AMDT.3573 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen
Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(1),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(3),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE]
- 7/22/2004 Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Sen Lugar, Richard G. [IN] - 7/22/2004
S.AMDT.3572 Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor:
Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) AMENDMENT PURPOSE: To provide a complete substitute and
amend the title.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8782-8783
STATUS:
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist
for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) 7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(3):
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Sen Lugar, Richard
G. [IN] - 7/22/2004 Sen Biden Jr., Joseph R. [DE] - 7/22/2004
S.AMDT.3574 Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COSPONSORS(1),
ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date) Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
2. S.AMDT.3573 to H.CON.RES.398 To
amend the preamble. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors
(1) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous
Consent.
S.AMDT.3573 Amends: H.CON.RES.398
Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) AMENDMENT PURPOSE: To amend the preamble.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8783-8785
STATUS:
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist
for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) 7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(1):
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. S.AMDT.3574 to H.CON.RES.398 To
amend the title. Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (introduced 7/22/2004) Cosponsors (1)
Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Senate amendment agreed to. Status: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous
Consent. S.AMDT.3574
Amends: H.CON.RES.398 Sponsor: Sen Kyl, Jon [AZ] (submitted 7/22/2004) (proposed 7/22/2004) AMENDMENT
PURPOSE: To amend the title.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S8785
STATUS:
7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3574 proposed by Senator Frist
for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798) 7/22/2004: Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous
Consent. COSPONSORS(1):
Sen Feinstein, Dianne [CA] - 7/22/2004 Bill Summary &
Status for the 108th Congress H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over
Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Henry Hyde [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Co-Sponsors
(51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment
and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. COSPONSORS(51), ALPHABETICAL [followed
by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date)Ackerman, Gary L. [NY-5] - 3/25/2004 Rep Baird, Brian
[WA-3] - 5/6/2004 Rep Bereuter, Doug [NE-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Berkley, Shelley [NV-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Berman,
Howard L. [CA-28] - 3/25/2004 Rep Biggert, Judy [IL-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Blackburn, Marsha [TN-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Blunt, Roy [MO-7] - 3/25/2004 Rep Boozman, John [AR-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Burton, Dan [IN-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Carson, Brad [OK-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Carter, John R. [TX-31] - 5/4/2004 Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] - 3/25/2004 Rep
Chandler, Ben [KY-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr. [AL-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Engel, Eliot L. [NY-17]
- 5/4/2004 Rep Etheridge, Bob [NC-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Feeney, Tom [FL-24] - 5/4/2004 Rep Frank, Barney
[MA-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36] - 5/4/2004 Rep Harris, Katherine [FL-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoeffel,
Joseph M. [PA-13] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hooley, Darlene [OR-5] - 5/4/2004 Rep Hoyer, Steny H. [MD-5] - 5/5/2004 Rep
Kelly, Sue W. [NY-19] - 5/4/2004 Rep King, Peter T. [NY-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Lampson, Nick [TX-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Lantos, Tom [CA-12] - 3/25/2004 Rep Markey, Edward J. [MA-7] - 5/4/2004 Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] - 5/5/2004 Rep
McCotter, Thaddeus G. [MI-11] - 5/4/2004 Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] - 5/4/2004 Rep Pence, Mike [IN-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Pickering, Charles W. (Chip) [MS-3] - 5/5/2004 Rep Pitts, Joseph R. [PA-16] - 5/4/2004 Rep Porter, Jon C. [NV-3]
- 5/4/2004 Rep Price, David E. [NC-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Ramstad, Jim [MN-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep Renzi, Rick
[AZ-1] - 5/5/2004 Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [FL-18] - 3/25/2004 Rep Schiff, Adam B. [CA-29] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Sherman, Brad [CA-27] - 3/25/2004 Rep Smith, Christopher H. [NJ-4] - 5/4/2004 Rep Souder, Mark E. [IN-3] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Strickland, Ted [OH-6] - 5/4/2004 Rep Sullivan, John [OK-1] - 5/4/2004 Rep Tauscher, Ellen O. [CA-10] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Terry, Lee [NE-2] - 5/4/2004 Rep Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] - 5/4/2004 Rep Weller, Jerry [IL-11] - 5/4/2004 Rep
Wexler, Robert [FL-19] - 5/4/2004 H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over
Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)
Cosponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with
an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details,
Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S):
(italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
OFFICIAL TITLE AS AMENDED BY SENATE: A concurrent resolution
expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS:
(color indicates Senate actions) 3/25/2004: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. 3/31/2004: Committee
Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote. 5/5/2004 6:28pm: Mr. Burton (IN) moved to
suspend the rules and agree to the resolution. 5/5/2004 6:29pm: Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration:
CR H2617-2623) 5/5/2004 7:05pm: At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant
to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed. 5/6/2004
3:15pm: Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: On motion to suspend the rules
and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR
5/5/2004 H2617-2619) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection. 5/6/2004: Received
in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
discharged by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3572 Amendment SA 3572 proposed by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) To
provide a complete substitute and amend the title. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 proposed by Senator Frist
for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798) To amend the preamble. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 proposed
by Senator Frist for Senator Kyl. (consideration: CR S8798; text: CR S8798) To amend the title. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3572
Amendment SA 3572 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3573 Amendment SA 3573 agreed to in Senate
by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: S.AMDT.3574 Amendment SA 3574 agreed to in Senate by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Resolution
agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEW
SEARCH | HOME | HELP | ABOUT STATUS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent
resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor:
Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004) Cosponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004
Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an
amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS:
(color indicates Senate actions) 3/25/2004: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. 3/31/2004: Committee
Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote. 5/5/2004 6:28pm: Mr. Burton (IN) moved to
suspend the rules and agree to the resolution. 5/5/2004 6:29pm: Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration:
CR H2617-2623) 5/5/2004 7:05pm: At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant
to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed. 5/6/2004
3:15pm: Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: On motion to suspend the rules
and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR
5/5/2004 H2617-2619) 5/6/2004 3:20pm: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection. 5/6/2004: Received
in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 7/22/2004: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
discharged by Unanimous Consent. 7/22/2004: Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
7/22/2004: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by
Unanimous Consent. H.CON.RES.398 Title: A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [IL-6] (introduced 3/25/2004)
Cosponsors (51) Latest Major Action: 7/22/2004 Passed/agreed to in Senate. Status: Resolution agreed to in Senate with
an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY AS OF: 5/6/2004--Passed House, without
amendment. (There is 1 other summary)
(This measure has not been amended since it was introduced.
The summary of that version is repeated here.)
States that Congress: (1) condemns Iran's continuing deceptions
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities,
and demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and cease nuclear
enrichment activities; (2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including
the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear
and other cooperation with Iran, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application
of safeguards; (3) calls upon all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain
from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; (4) urges the IAEA Board
of Governors to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements; (5) urges
the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other international entities
to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under NPT who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium
enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit
their right to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities; (6) urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures
to support IAEA inspection efforts; and (7) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning
the matters addressed in this resolution. There are 4 versions of Bill Number H.CON.RES.398 for the 108th Congress 1 .
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)[H.CON.RES.398.IH]
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Introduced in House)
HCON 398 IH
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398 Expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 25, 2004 Mr. HYDE
(for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN, and Mr. CHABOT) submitted the
following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert
the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary
to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to
produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility
under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition
group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all
nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing
and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material
into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear
activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board
of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required
by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003,
called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear
activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between
Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and
requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director
General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend
all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified
nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using
its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had
a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation
of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it
had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation
to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional
Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed
material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic
activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA,
which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again,
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24,
2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more
sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible
explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear
weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations
of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this
suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing
it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its
research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention
of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October
16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full
picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September
12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed
to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology,
and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran,
as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the
Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development
program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did
not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's
November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated
research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs
for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and
that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location,
extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities
involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13,
2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question
Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in
dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community,
its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement,
indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in
acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing
deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear
programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use
items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18
years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel
cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure
of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004,
by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research
programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease
all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear
enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and
legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its
nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's
decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of
all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope
of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to
resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased
all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what
further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the
IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance
of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent
and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military
nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities
not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and
Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural
gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial
entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support
Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any
nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not
conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose
nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and
all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations,
and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the
development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest
opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's
nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding
uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby
forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council
to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in
clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and
currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.
2 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate Committee after being Received from House)[H.CON.RES.398.RFS]
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Referred to Senate Committee after being Received from House)
HCON 398 RFS
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 6, 2004 Received and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the concern of
Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert
the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary
to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to
produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility
under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition
group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all
nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing
and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material
into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear
activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board
of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required
by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003,
called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear
activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between
Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and
requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director
General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend
all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified
nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using
its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had
a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation
of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it
had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation
to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional
Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed
material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic
activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA,
which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again,
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24,
2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more
sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible
explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear
weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations
of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this
suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing
it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its
research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention
of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October
16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full
picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September
12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed
to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology,
and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran,
as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the
Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development
program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did
not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's
November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated
research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs
for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and
that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location,
extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities
involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13,
2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question
Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in
dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community,
its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement,
indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in
acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing
deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear
programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use
items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18
years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel
cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure
of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004,
by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research
programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease
all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear
enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and
legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its
nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's
decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of
all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope
of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to
resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased
all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what
further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the
IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance
of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent
and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military
nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities
not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and
Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural
gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial
entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support
Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any
nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not
conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose
nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and
all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations,
and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the
development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest
opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's
nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding
uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby
forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council
to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in
clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and
currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
Attest:
JEFF TRANDAHL,
Clerk.
3 . Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)[H.CON.RES.398.EH]
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the means to produce nuclear weapons. (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the concern of Congress
over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
HCON 398 EH
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Whereas the United States
has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention
to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to
produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility
under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition
group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all
nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--the processing
and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material
into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear
activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board
of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required
by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003,
called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear
activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between
Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and
requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director
General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend
all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified
nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using
its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had
a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation
of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it
had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation
to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional
Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed
material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic
activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA,
which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again,
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24,
2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more
sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible
explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear
weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations
of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this
suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing
it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its
research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention
of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October
16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a `full
picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September
12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed
to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology,
and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran,
as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the
Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development
program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did
not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's
November 2003 resolution', and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated
research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs
for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and
that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location,
extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities
involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13,
2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question
Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in
dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community,
its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement,
indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in
acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing
deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear
programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use
items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18
years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel
cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure
of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004,
by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research
programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease
all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear
enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and
legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its
nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's
decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of
all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope
of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to
resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased
all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what
further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the
IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance
of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent
and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military
nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities
not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and
Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural
gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial
entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support
Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any
nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not
conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose
nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and
all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations,
and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the
development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest
opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's
nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding
uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby
forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council
to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in
clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and
currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.
Attest:
Clerk 4 . Resolved, That the resolution from the House
of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development
of the... (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)[H.CON.RES.398.EAS]
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Representatives
(H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the... (Engrossed
Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)
HCON 398 EAS
In the Senate of the United States,
July 22, 2004. Resolved, That the resolution from the
House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled `Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's
development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.', do pass with the following
AMENDMENTS:
( 1 ) Page 1, strike out the preamble and insert: Whereas
it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer
to Iran of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could contribute to its
acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that `all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons and their means of delivery';
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous
times on persons and entities transferring equipment and technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass destruction
programs;
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5,
1970 (the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty');
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility
under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition
group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all
nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium
dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report
that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that neither its
light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material
into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear
activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board
of Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its
Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, including
those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran
admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that included
bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003,
called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear
activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran
and the IAEA for the application of safeguards (the `Additional Protocol') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities
within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's
nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend
all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain
international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using
its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had
a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another
violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment
program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of June
1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran `had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 percent to
9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 percent';
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's
declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information that should have been provided, including the fact that `some
samples from' the laser uranium enrichment project `had been sent for assessment to the supplier's laboratory';
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted
that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation
of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed
material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic
activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA,
in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again,
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report,
found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated
enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and providing incomplete
and unsupported explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful
as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24,
2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment
that had been present in that workshop showed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite
finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium contamination at that
workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of contamination
at both sites is imported centrifuge components and perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than
1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004,
report, that `the contamination is different on domestic and imported centrifuges,' that `it is unlikely' that the 36 percent
U-235 contamination was due to components acquired from Iran's principal supplier country, and that `important information
about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to involve changing
or contradictory information';
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations
of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community of full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this
suspension is temporary and continued to manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium enrichment centrifuge parts
and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its
research into more sophisticated `P2' uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention
of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16,
2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present
a `full picture of its nuclear activities' and `full transparency';
(2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September
12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to `leave no stone unturned' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives; Whereas
Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that
Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal
to international inspectors;
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will
soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented,
would undercut the international effort to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with `serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did
not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's
November 2003 resolution,' and also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated
research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs
for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted `with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and
that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location,
extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities
involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13,
2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in mid-April,
2004, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into serious question
Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities;
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its
intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material for
uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment activities `does
not include suspension of production of UF6,' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June
18, 2004, which was also adopted unanimously, `deplores' the fact that `Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and
proactive as it should have been' and `underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that
Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant
information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons';
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that
Iran's suspension `commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining
shortcomings';
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further
confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion
Facility and its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions
would make it easier for Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities
in Iran;
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production
of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, which called
on Iran `to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities,' and Iran's voluntary suspension of all uranium enrichment
activities pursuant to its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in
dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community,
its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear weapon design to
another country, its production of centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization workshops, and its repeated breaches
of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons; and
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security and threaten United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring),
( 2 ) Page 8, line 2, strike out all after the resolving
clause and insert:
That Congress--
(1) condemns--
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two
decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of
its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
(B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the
IAEA and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department
of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments
that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever
financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in
this resolution referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'), including the United States, to use appropriate means
to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including
the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the `Additional Protocol') and is clearly in compliance with its obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during
the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of
a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment,
and facilities;
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure
of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 2004,
and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will
not disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter
and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the positive
example of Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent
disclosure of all its nuclear activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence
the extent and scope of Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual
lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs between the United States and Libya;
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country
renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its support
for international terrorist organizations;
(9) notes the assistance that the United States has provided
to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on December 26, 2003;
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease
all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment activities, including
importing, manufacturing, and testing of related equipment;
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international commitments
and to rescind its decisions--
(A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
(B) to produce feed material that could be used in those
centrifuges; and
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could
be used for plutonium production;
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and
legal obligations--
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted
access;
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear
activities; and
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all
its nuclear programs;
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United
States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European Union and the United States pledged to implement United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies actions states should take--
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
(B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8
Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty;
(14) urges close cooperation between the United States
and the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in their June 26, 2004, declaration of `the IAEA Board of Governors'
Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a
timely and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities';
(15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to
resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has suspended
all nuclear weapons development activity, and not to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and permanently
ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing activities;
(16) further calls upon the members of the European Union
to undertake such additional measures, including imposing sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance
pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development
activity and to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance
of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and
in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community
regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities
not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and
Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural
gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial
entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or suspend all investment and investment-related activities that support
Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent
the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons
program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully
with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear
power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon Russia--
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully
its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude
a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor that would enter into force before Iran has verifiably and permanently
ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing activities;
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose
nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Germany--
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals,
sites, and information related to the investigations;
(C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals
and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
(D) to immediately review and rectify their export control
laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could
support the development of nuclear weapons;
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with
Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
(A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that
Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA; and
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran continues
to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance
is uncertain;
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing
in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the `proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their
means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,' to consider measures necessary--
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine
nuclear activities;
(22) further urges the United Nations Security Council,
immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations,
to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action as
may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium
enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear program thereby forfeit
their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(24) further urges the United Nations Security Council,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant international entities,
and all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to seek consensus, no later than
the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to
limit the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the
development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states assured and affordable access to--
(A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in peaceful
nuclear activities; and
(B) spent fuel management; and
(25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently
informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution. Amend the title so as to read: `Concurrent resolution expressing
the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.'.
Attest:
Secretary.
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
AMENDMENTS H. CON. RES. 398: EXPRESSING THE CONCERN
OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- HON. RON PAUL (Extensions of Remarks - May
17, 2004)
[Page: E877] GPO's PDF ---
HON. RON PAUL OF TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday,
May 17, 2004
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this
ill-conceived and ill-timed legislation. Let's not fool ourselves: this concurrent resolution leads us down the road to war
against Iran. It creates a precedent for future escalation, as did similar legislation endorsing ``regime change'' in Iraq
back in 1998.
I find it incomprehensible that as the failure of our Iraq
policy becomes more evident--even to its most determined advocates--we here are approving the same kind of policy toward Iran.
With Iraq becoming more of a problem daily, the solution as envisioned by this legislation is to look for yet another fight.
And we should not fool ourselves: this legislation sets the stage for direct conflict with Iran. The resolution ``calls upon
all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all
appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons .....'' Note the phrase ``use all appropriate
means.''
Additionally, this legislation calls for yet more and stricter
sanctions on Iran, including a demand that other countries also impose sanctions on Iran. As we know, sanctions are unmistakably
a move toward war, particularly when, as in this legislation, a demand is made that the other nations of the world similarly
isolate and blockade the country. Those who wish for a regime change in Iran should especially reject sanctions--just look
at how our Cuba policy has allowed Fidel Castro to maintain his hold on power for decades. Sanctions do not hurt political
leaders, as we know most recently from our sanctions against Iraq, but rather sow misery among the poorest and most vulnerable
segments of society. Dictators do not go hungry when sanctions are imposed.
It is somewhat ironic that vie are again meddling in Iranian
affairs. Students of history will recall that the U.S. government's ill-advised coup against Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh
in 1953 and its subsequent installation of the Shah as the supreme ruler led to intense hatred of the United States and eventually
to the radical Islamic revolution of 1979. One can only wonder what our relations would be with Iran if not for the decades
of meddling in that country's internal affairs. We likely would not be considering resolutions such as this. Yet the solution
to all the difficulties created by our meddling foreign policy always seems to be yet more meddling. Will Congress ever learn?
I urge my colleagues to reject this move toward war with
Iran, to reject the failed policies of regime-change and nation-building, and to return to the wise and consistent policy
of non-interventionism in the affairs of other sovereign nations. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 152 (Republicans in
roman; Democrats in italic; Independents underlined)
H CON RES 398 2/3 YEA-AND-NAY 6-May-2004 3:19 PM QUESTION:
On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree BILL TITLE: Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of
the means to produce nuclear weapons
\l "Y" \l "N" \l "P" \l "NV" Republican 203 1 23 Democratic 172 2 14 17 Independent 1 TOTALS 376 3 14 40
---- YEAS 376 ---
Abercrombie Ackerman Aderholt Akin Alexander Allen Andrews Bachus Baird Baker Baldwin Ballance Barrett
(SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Bass Beauprez Becerra Bell Bereuter Berman Berry Biggert Bilirakis Bishop
(GA) Bishop (NY) Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blumenauer Boehlert Bonilla Bonner Boozman Boswell Boucher Bradley
(NH) Brady (PA) Brady (TX) Brown (OH) Brown (SC) Brown, Corrine Brown-Waite, Ginny Burns Burr Burton
(IN) Buyer Calvert Camp Cannon Cantor Capito Capps Cardin Cardoza Carson (IN) Carson (OK) Carter Case Castle Chabot Chandler Chocola Clay Clyburn Coble Collins Cooper Costello Cox Cramer Crane Crenshaw Crowley Cubin Culberson Cummings Cunningham Davis
(AL) Davis (CA) Davis (FL) Davis (IL) Davis (TN) Davis, Tom Deal (GA) DeFazio DeGette DeLauro DeLay Deutsch Diaz-Balart,
L. Diaz-Balart, M. Dicks Dingell Doggett Dooley (CA) Doolittle Dreier Duncan Dunn Edwards Ehlers Emanuel Emerson Engel English Eshoo Etheridge Evans Everett Fattah Ferguson Flake Foley Forbes Ford Fossella Frank
(MA) Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Frost Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gibbons Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gonzalez Goode Goodlatte Gordon Goss Graves Green
(TX) Green (WI) Grijalva Gutknecht Hall Harman Harris Hart Hastings (FL) Hayes Hayworth Hefley Hensarling Herger Hill Hinojosa Hobson Hoeffel Hoekstra Holden Holt Honda Hooley
(OR) Hostettler Houghton Hoyer Hulshof Hyde Inslee Isakson Israel Issa Istook Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee
(TX) Jefferson Johnson (CT) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Kaptur Keller Kelly Kennedy
(MN) Kennedy (RI) Kildee Kilpatrick Kind King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kleczka Kline Knollenberg Kolbe LaHood Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen
(WA) Larson (CT) LaTourette Leach Levin Lewis (CA) Lewis (GA) Linder Lipinski LoBiondo Lofgren Lowey Lucas
(KY) Lucas (OK) Lynch Majette Maloney Manzullo Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (MO) McCarthy
(NY) McCotter McGovern McInnis McIntyre McKeon Meehan Meek (FL) Menendez Mica Michaud Millender-McDonald Miller
(FL) Miller (MI) Miller (NC) Miller, Gary Moore Moran (KS) Moran (VA) Murphy Murtha Musgrave Myrick Nadler Napolitano Nethercutt Neugebauer Ney Northup Norwood Nunes Nussle Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Osborne Ose Otter Owens Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Pearce Pelosi Pence Peterson
(MN) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Pombo Pomeroy Porter Portman Price (NC) Pryce (OH) Putnam Quinn Radanovich Ramstad Rangel Regula Rehberg Renzi Reynolds Rodriguez Rogers
(AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Royce Ruppersberger Rush Ryan
(OH) Ryan (WI) Ryun (KS) Sabo Sánchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sanders Sandlin Saxton Schakowsky Schiff Schrock Scott
(GA) Scott (VA) Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shaw Shays Sherman Sherwood Shimkus Shuster Simmons Simpson Skelton Slaughter Smith
(MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Smith (WA) Snyder Souder Stearns Stenholm Strickland Stupak Sullivan Sweeney Tancredo Tanner Tauscher Taylor
(MS) Taylor (NC) Terry Thomas Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Tierney Toomey Towns Turner
(OH) Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Upton Van Hollen Velázquez Visclosky Vitter Walden (OR) Walsh Wamp Watt Waxman Weiner Weldon
(FL) Weldon (PA) Weller Wexler Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wolf Wu Wynn Young (AK)
---- NAYS 3 --- Conyers Kucinich Paul
---- ANSWERED "PRESENT" 14 --- Capuano Filner Hinchey Kanjorski Lee McDermott Miller,
George Mollohan Rahall Serrano Stark Waters Watson Woolsey
---- NOT VOTING 40 --- Baca Ballenger Berkley Blunt Boehner Bono Boyd Burgess Cole Davis,
Jo Ann Delahunt DeMint Doyle Farr Feeney Gephardt Granger Greenwood Gutierrez Hastings
(WA) Hunter Jenkins John Latham Lewis (KY) McCollum McCrery McHugh McNulty Meeks (NY) Neal
(MA) Oxley Peterson (PA) Reyes Solis Spratt Tauzin Turner (TX) Wilson (SC) Young (FL)
|